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ABSTRACT 
U.S. Navy aviation squadrons conduct a variety of flight operations in peace and 
wartime environments. At the heart of these operations is the flight scheduling that occurs 
to command and control the squadron’s assets to ensure the actors and processes carry 
out the squadron’s operations seamlessly and meet the squadron’s mission requirements. 
This research and case study demonstrates how the Knowledge Value Added 
Methodology (KVA) and Business Process Reengineering (BPR) can be applied to these 
processes to analyze the performance and effectiveness of a Navy squadron’s operations 
and maintenance departments. By analyzing the outputs of the sub processes involved at 
the squadron level in common units of change, a price per unit of output can be generated 
to allocate both cost and revenue at the sub process level. With this level of financial 
detail, a return on investment (ROI) analysis can be conducted for each process and the 
changes that occur to the processes when reengineering. A determination can then be 
made as to what level of reengineering if any should occur to the system to maximize 
ROI and what types of reengineering such as reducing costs, increasing value or 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The research team utilized the Knowledge Value Added Methodology (KVA) and 
Business Process Reengineering (BPR) to create a current “As Is” view, incrementally 
improved “To Be” view and redesigned “Radical” view of VFA-14 Strike Fighter 
Squadron’s operations and maintenance department. The “As Is” view is the current 
depiction of the processes that occur on a daily basis to generate the squadron’s flight 
schedule. These processes are highly manual in nature with limited use of Information 
Technology to aid squadron personnel in their completion. An incrementally improved 
“To Be” version of the same departments and their processes were created to demonstrate 
how reducing redundant processes and implementing IT resources would create an 
incrementally improved version of the “As Is” process. 
A “Radical” depiction of the “As Is” and “To Be” views were then created to 
show what these processes would look like once resigned by implementing large amounts 
of IT to assist in completing the sub processes and streamlining all the processes to make 
them more efficient. The input for the radical views is obtained from the Israeli Air Force 
who utilizes an ERP and DSS program called OV-OMS 3.0 to run the command and 
control for their aviation squadrons. The “Radical” view of the Navy squadron’s 
operations and maintenance departments is the anticipated improvements that would be 
gained if the processes that occur were resigned efficiently and the use of a program such 
as OV-OMS 3.0 were used to assist the Operation department’s daily generation of the 
flight schedule and the maintenance department’s support of the flight schedule. 
The KVA methodology measures the common units of output and the changes to 
the output that occur to these processes when redesigning. It assumes that knowledge is 
valuable to the organization as measured by the amount of learning time, which is a 
surrogate for complexity, that must occur in an individual or system before a process can 
be completed. KVA theory with market comparables enabled the research team to 
identify the processes with the “As Is”, incrementally improve them into the “To Be”, 
and then redesign further into the “Radical” while measuring the changes that occurred in  
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common units. Dollars are used as the common units to display the results in the 
language of financial analysis and determine the ROI of implementing IT resources in the 
form of an ERP into the manual “As Is” system. 
The total return on knowledge percentages increases from the “As-Is”, “To-Be” 
and “Radical” models. The “As-Is” model returns a total ROK of 3427%. After 
incrementally improving the “As-Is” model with logical changes, the “To-Be” model 
returns a ROK of 4056%. This increase of 629% represents the result of applying 
minimal BPR techniques to reduce redundant processes and implementing small 
increases of information technology into largely manual processes. The “Radical” model 
returns an ROK of 6320% which is an increase of 2264% from the “To-Be” model. This 
model represents a larger redesign of processes with large increases of information 
technology to facilitate executing the processes. The input for the “Radical” models in 
both the operations and maintenance processes was attained from current practices in the 
Israeli Air Force who utilize an ERP program for similar processes. The Israeli Air 
Forces “As-Is” models and processes were the vision for the US Navy’s “Radical” 
models represented in this case study. 
The cost of the processes or denominator in the ROI equation decreases from 
$129.07 in the As Is models to $69.98 in the radical models. The total allocated 
knowledge increases from 1585.25 knowledge units in the As Is models to 3201.24 
knowledge units in the radical models. The research team concludes that implementing 
IT resources such as an ERP into Navy aviation operations and maintenance processes 
would provide positive results. This type of BPR should be examined and pursued if the 
opportunities present themselves and the resources and will exist to drive the change. 
By assuming the “Radical” models were implemented in a US Navy squadron 
similar to the one examined in the case study, the following results could be expected. 
For the operations and maintenance departments to execute all of the processes on a daily 
basis to generate an approved flight schedule ready for execution would take 
approximately 7.2 hours of effort by the various actors occurring either in tandem or 
sequentially. The theoretical revenue generated per hour by these processes is $4,423.08. 
This would generate approximately $31,846 of revenue per day in the generation of a 
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daily flight schedule. Assuming a squadron produces this flight schedule five times a 
week and 50 weeks out of the year, annual revenue of approximately $7,961,500 could be 
expected.  The 12 squadron estimate revenue would be approximately $95,538,000. 
The personnel costs to execute the processes in the “Radical” models for the 
operations and maintenance department are $69.98 per hour. By executing the processes 
in the same 7.2 hours and following the same number of occurrences per year to generate 
the flight schedule, the personnel costs per year to generate an approved flight schedule 
are $125,962.50. This would yield net revenue of $7,835,537.50 per year to generate a 
daily flight schedule using the processes in the “Radical” models.  The personnel costs 
over 12 squadrons would be approximately $1,511,550. 
The information technology costs for the system have not been addressed thus far.  
The following data has been obtained from Mr. Gamliel “Jicko” Shitrit, Director of 
Engineering at Xvionics Corporation.  The costs to implement the system in one Navy 
Squadron such as the squadron used in the case study, VFA-14 would include 
implementation, licensing, maintenance, integration and customization.  The total cost in 
year for a one squadron implementation would be approximately $585,000.  This is a 
conservative estimate based on the number of systems the XV-OMS program would have 
to integrate with.  The integration costs are approximately $50,000 per system XV-OMS 
would have to operate with.  The $585,000 reflects only one integration cost of $50,000.  
This is a conservative estimate of the potential systems XV-OMS would have to integrate 
with as the current US Navy “As-Is” model reflects limited essential IT systems in use at 
the squadron level to conduct flight planning and maintenance activities.  The costs to 
implement XV-OMS over 12 squadrons would be approximately $5,668,000 assuming 
each squadron integrated XV-OMS with one system.  This reflects roughly a 10% 
discount in costs over a single squadron implementation. 
The potential ROI from implementing XV-OMS ERP into a Navy squadron 
would be the annual estimated revenue of $7,961,000 less the personnel costs of 
$125,962.50 less the year one implementation cost of $585,000 divided by the personnel 
costs and implementation costs equals an ROI of approximately 1019.8% for one Navy 
squadron.  The ROI for a 12 squadron implementation using the same formula would be 
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approximately 1230.7%.  These ROI calculations are based on conservative estimates of 
revenue and cost data and neither captures all of the potential costs, nor do they factor in 
the depreciation of the year one implementation costs over the lifecycle of the system.  
With over a 1000% ROI on the implementation of the XV-OMS system, these estimates 
are orders of magnitude above the breakeven point and make the acquisition and 




A. PURPOSE STATEMENT  
The Department of Defense (DoD) is constantly tasked with doing more with less. 
The volatile nature of the organization and the missions it carries out require great 
flexibility on the part of DoD managers and its member’s ability to adapt to rapid change. 
There will never be enough resources to support all the systems and programs the DoD 
feels it needs in order to carry out the multitude of missions and maintain the necessary 
capabilities in support of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America.  
The Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology authored by Professors 
Housel and Bell is a tool for decision makers and resource managers to evaluate the value 
of programs and processes to determine what program and processes have more or less 
value to the organization.1 The KVA methodology can provide this measurement using 
revenue obtained from the market comparables approach to calculate the Return on 
Knowledge (ROK) ratio on an organization’s entire process under evaluation or 
individual sub processes. This information can assist decision makers in determining 
where the resources of the organization are best utilized and on which processes will give 
the organization the highest ROK. The methodology and analysis does not deliver a 
perfect product from which decision makers can rely solely upon to make resource 
decisions or process improvement changes, however, it gives them a more logical and 
objective measure than other rationale for allocating limited resources. Traditionally 
these decisions could be biased or influenced by political motivations or subjective 
assessments about the value of a DoD organization or process.  
The methodology will be applied to a Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet squadron based 
out of NAS Lemoore Ca. VFA-14 produces a daily flight schedule every day in which the 
squadron conducts flight operations. The KVA methodology, with market comparables 
approach, will be applied to the operation and maintenance departments’ process of 
producing an approved daily flight schedule once all the various inputs are  
 
                                                 
1 T. Housel and A.H. Bell. Measuring and Managing Knowledge, McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2001, p. 91. 
2 
received and de-conflicted. The KVA methodology will show the break down of this 
process into the various sub processes and the role of the various actors involved in the 
process. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Navy F/A-18 aircraft squadrons operate around the world 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week in a wide variety of operational environments, conducting a myriad of 
different types of operations that range from fleet replacement training to tactical strike 
missions. Today's modern operational Navy F/A-18 squadron would not be nearly as 
successful as it is, if it were not for the ability of each squadron to effectively plan and 
schedule flight missions, as well as the aircraft maintenance required in order to support 
its various missions.  
While not deployed, Navy squadrons are attached to their respective Naval Air 
Stations around the world, with their primary responsibility being that of training and 
preparing for each of the squadrons upcoming deployment. This period of time is 
characterized by a rather lengthy training cycle, most commonly referred to as 
“workups”.  
Workups, at a minimum, consist of a formal flight training syllabus that ranges in 
complexity from basic orientation flights for newly accessed pilots, to more difficult 
tasks such as multi-aircraft combined arms engagement training, all of which occur prior 
to the squadron's deployment.  
Like many of the different types of organizations within the Navy, the sufficient 
availability of time and funding act many times as primarily two of the largest 
constraining factors. Each of the squadron’s largest two departments, Operations and 
Maintenance, must balance those constraining factors with finite resources such as 
available aircraft, pilots, maintenance man-power, available flight-hours, fuel, 
replacement parts as well as a multitude of other factors.  
The ultimate goal of this effort is to effectively and properly train each of the 
squadrons pilots in order to assure that they will be fully prepared for the missions they 
will conduct while on routine deployment, or during a time of war.  
3 
In day-to-day operations, the squadron Operations Department, commonly 
referred to as OPS, works from a set of long-term requirements that include such a thing 
as a training syllabus. This training syllabus is a series of requirements that all pilots must 
complete prior to a deployment with the possibility in mind that they may have to execute 
the training during a live hostile environment. The OPS department, with guidance from 
the squadron training officer, is responsible for the creation of the daily flight scheduling 
process to schedule the flights required to meet the objectives of the squadron’s training 
syllabus.  
The current state of daily operations is largely a manual process that consists of 
very little use of IT and a heavy reliance on the use of white boards. In many cases, the 
use of MS Excel spreadsheets is about as automated as the process ever becomes. The 
creation of the daily flight schedule involves the input of several key squadron personnel 
such as the Operations Officer (OPSO), Assistant Operations Officer (AOPSO), 
Schedules Officer (Scheds-O), Training Officer, NATOPS Officer, and the Commanding 
Officer (CO).  
The result of this collaborative effort produces inputs that generate a preliminary 
(rough) daily flight schedule that will eventually be de-conflicted and reviewed by the 
necessary parties before it is submitted for ultimate approval and signature by the CO. 
Once the daily flight schedule has been approved, it becomes the basis for the next day's 
flight events, as well as other non-flying events.  
The daily flight schedule is essentially the squadron's daily operational center of 
gravity around which all other events revolve. This is especially true for the Maintenance 
Department, whose primary responsibility is providing for the successful execution (e.g. 
the launching, recovery and fueling of aircraft) of the daily flight schedule, in addition to 
all other aircraft maintenance-related responsibilities.  
The process of creating a daily flight schedule occurs each day the squadron is 
flying. Normally flights will only be scheduled for Monday through Friday while at their 
home base of Naval Air Station (NAS) Lemoore California, but occasionally a 
commitment will arise that requires a weekend flight schedule to be created as well.  
4 
The squadron that we based our research efforts on is Strike Fighter Squadron 
Fourteen (VFA-14), based out of NAS Lemoore California whom recently transitioned 
from the Grumman F-14 Tomcat to the Navy's newest addition, the Boeing F/A-18E 
“Super Hornet”.  
VFA-14, like all Navy squadrons, utilizes the Schedules Officer to receive and 
incorporate all inputs from the various actors; such as the Training Officer and NATOPS 
Officer as well as the inputs from individual pilots who may be called upon to fly on a 
particular day in support of the flight schedule. Individual pilots may also provide input 
in the form of personal conflicts, or requests, commonly known as “snivels”. These 
snivels may include requests such as doctor’s appointments or other types of limitations 
to their availability to fly on a particular day or at a certain time.  
The VFA-14 Schedules Officer uses primarily white boards, with some 
supplementary Information Technology (IT) resources such a Microsoft Word, Excel, 
and a new scheduling program called SHARP in order to help consolidate the daily inputs 
and to summarily generate the rough schedule for review and eventual approval by the 
key squadron personnel. 
 
5 
II. KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED (KVA) 
A. THE KVA SOLUTION 
1. Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) Theory 
The Knowledge-Value-Added (KVA) methodology authored by Dr. Thomas 
Housel (Naval Postgraduate School) and Dr. Valery Kanevsky (Agilent Labs) initiated 
fifteen years ago is based on the principle that organizations, their people, processes and 
information systems have knowledge which equates to value to the organization. KVA 
helps identify the location of this knowledge in the organization and quantify it into value 
with a Return on Knowledge (ROK) ratio.2 KVA is based on entropy and complexity 
theory and was developed to assist with business process reengineering efforts looking to 
measure the value of organizational processes versus the costs to generate the value. 
Entropy is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary as “a measure of the degree of 
disorder or change in a closed system.” It can act as a surrogate for the amount of change 
that occurs to a business process from its input to the resulting output.3 
By conducting a KVA analysis, managers and decision makers can determine 
which processes, people or assets are more valuable to the organization and where the 
resources of the organization are best directed to maximize their value and profitability.4 
They can examine how changes to the processes will affect the outputs and ascertain 
whether those changes to the output result in improved and more profitable processes for 
the organization. A common unit of knowledge is used to observe and measure the 
performance of an organization’s processes to determine the ROK ratios. By using the 
market comparables approach, the ROK ratios can then be monetized into a common unit 
of output in dollars for financial analysis. 
2. KVA Assumptions 
The KVA methodology must identify and address the inherent assumptions in the 
methodology to ensure a basic level of understanding and reduce any uncertainty. KVA 
                                                 
2 Housel and Bell, p. 91. 
3 T. Housel, O. El Sawy, J. Zhong, and W. Rodgers, “Models for Measuring the Return on Information 
Technology: A Proof of Concept Demonstration.” 22nd International Conference on Information Systems. 
December 2001. p. 13. 
4 Housel and Bell, p. 91. 
6 
examines the changes to the organizational processes or entropy and assess the value 
gained from these changes. The input for the change is the knowledge required to make 
the change. KVA measures the inputs, the changes and the value gained from these 
changes. Figure 1 illustrates the basic concept behind KVA theory. 
 
 
Figure 1.   The Housel-Kanevsky Value-Added Cycle.5 
 
KVA theory makes the assumption that all process outputs can be described in 
equivalent units such as the time required to learn how to produce an output. This 
provides the following advantages listed below:6 
1.  All Processes can be compared in terms of their relative productivity 
2.  Revenue can be allocated to a common unit of output 
3.  Value added by IT in terms of its outputs can be measured in common 
units 
4.  The cost to produce units of output can be measured in common units 
5.  Organizational productivity has a common unit of measure 
The description and measurement of all an organization’s process outputs into a 
common unit of output enables analysts to assign revenue and cost to the units of output. 
This enables traditional accounting measures and financial analysis to be applied to the 
organization at the sub-organizational level. Without a KVA analysis, traditional 
financial analysis could only be performed at the corporate aggregate level and still 
maintain a reasonable level of confidence in the accuracy of the results. 
                                                 
5 Housel and Bell, p. 94.  
6 Housel and Bell, p. 11. 
7 
An additional assumption is the concept of Learning Time. Learning time is a 
surrogate for the procedural knowledge required to conduct a process and produce the 
process outputs. It is also a surrogate for complexity where more complex processes 
should require more learning time before it can be successfully performed. The 
procedural knowledge can be embedded in the people who conduct the process, an IT 
system or manuals and references called upon to train personnel or operate systems. The 
units of learning time are represented by the variable K and represent common units of 
output. By executing a process once, a single unit of output is produced as one unit of K. 
The return on K or knowledge can then be calculated and represented as a ROK ratio. 
The market comparable approach can then apply a revenue stream to the process to 
determine the ROI for the process. 
The three approaches that can be used in KVA theory to determine the common 
unit of knowledge are learning time, process description, or binary query method.7 These 
three methods are illustrated in Table 1. 
For the purposes of this thesis and the analysis of VFA-14 flight scheduling and 
maintenance processes, learning time will be the method utilized and applied to the case 
study that follows. Learning time was chosen to conduct the knowledge audit over the 
other three methods for its straightforward and understandable steps. The remaining two 
methods, process description and binary query method will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Learning time is also the most relevant method to apply to a Navy aviation 
squadron’s processes and the easiest to explain to the numerous squadron personnel that 
were interviewed while collecting data. Learning time is a surrogate for complexity 
meaning the longer it takes to learn how to do a process the more complex it should be. 
                                                 









process and its 
component processes. 
Identify compound 
process and its 
component processes. 
Identify compound 
process and its 
component processes. 
Establish common 
units to measure learning 
time. 
Describe the 
products in terms of the 
instructions required to 
reproduce them and 
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Create a set of 
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such that all possible 
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words, pages in manual, 
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component processes. 
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enough to capture a 
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sampling time period long 
enough to capture a 
representative sample of 




learning time for each 
component process by the 
number of times the 
component executes 
during sample period. 
Multiply the 
number of process words 
used to describe each 
component process by the 
number of times the 
component executes 
during sample period. 
Multiply the length 
of the YES/NO string for 
each component process 
by the number of times 
this component executes 
during sample period. 
Allocate revenue to 
component processes in 
proportion to the 
quantities generated by 
previous step. 
Allocate revenue to 
component processes in 
proportion to the 
quantities generated by 
previous step. 
Allocate revenue to 
component processes in 
proportion to the 
quantities generated by 
previous step. 
Calculate the cost 
to execute each 
component process, 
calculate return on 
investment per process by 
dividing revenue allocated 
to component process by 
cost of component 
Calculate the cost 
to execute each 
component process, 
calculate return on 
investment per process by 
dividing revenue allocated 
to component process by 
cost of component 
Calculate the cost 
to execute each 
component process, 
calculate return on 
investment per process by 
dividing revenue allocated 
to component process by 
cost of component 
 
Table 1.   The Three Approaches to KVA 
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The person doing the process must call upon more knowledge or the learning they 
went through to complete the process or action successfully. KVA theory calculates the 
ROK ratio for a process and its sub processes. The ROK ratio is based on the benefits of 
the process divided by the costs to complete the process. The theory works best for profit 
companies that generate revenue and have traditional costs associated with their 
processes. The revenue and the costs can be allocated to the processes being examined to 
determine which ones are the most profitable. The DoD does not generate revenue, but 
has costs associated with all of its processes. In order to apply the theory to DoD 
processes the market comparables approach is utilized to generate a revenue stream that 
can be allocated to DoD’s non revenue generating processes. 
B. KVA METHODOLOGY 
1. The Value Problem 
Public and private sector organizations need a valuation method to determine the 
value and knowledge resident in their personnel and IT systems. Subjective evaluations 
do little to accurately measure the organization in order to justify the investment of IT 
resources for the organization. The term value must be defined as value can be 
interpreted in different ways depending on the context it is applies to. Dr Myron L. 
Cramer defines the term value in terms of dollars as how much is earned or saved. The 
metric of dollar-value is primarily used in assessing contributions in a commercial or 
business context.8  
The DoD represents a unique challenge when attempting to value its 
organizations processes, personnel, systems and missions. As a not for profit organization 
that does not generate a revenue stream or income, it is difficult to determine the revenue 
or benefits side of the ROI equation. Valuing the mission effectiveness of combat 
operations or peace time deterrence is a unique and difficult challenge as it is impossible 
to predict what would have happened if DoD operations had not been conducted. This 
challenge usually relegates this debate to determining the costs that were avoided or 
would have been avoided if the DoD had not been present to prevent a conflict or contain 
a crisis. ROI is typically used inaccurately to measure this cost avoidance and the 
                                                 
8 Myron Cramer, “Measuring the Value of Information.” Atlanta, GA: Georgia Tech Research 
Institute. 20 July 2005, http://iw.gtri.gatech.edu, last accessed 31 August 2006, p. 2. 
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subjective value of the DoD for generating it. When used accurately ROI must measure 
the benefits or revenue generated in the numerator of the ROI equation.  
The DoD is presented with an additional challenge to quantify the measure of the 
value of its processes and personnel, regardless of the methodology used, into some 
common unit of output. Value is traditionally measured and reported in dollars as a price 
per unit of output in for-profit organizations. As DoD is a not-for-profit organization, the 
measured value cannot be represented in a price per unit of output in dollars. An alternate 
approach from a traditional for-profit organization must be used to conduct a financial 
analysis of the DoD. 
2. The Method 
The Knowledge-Value-Added (KVA) methodology is based on the principle that 
organizations, their people and their processes have knowledge which equates to value to 
the organization. KVA helps identify the location of this knowledge in the organization 
and quantify it into value with a Return on Knowledge (ROK) ratio.9 By doing this, 
managers and decision makers can determine which processes, people, or assets are more 
valuable to the organization and where the resources of the organization are best directed 
to maximize their value and profitability.10 A common unit of knowledge is used to 
observe and measure the performance of an organization’s processes to determine the 
ROK ratios.  
                                                 
9 Housel and Bell, pp. 91-95. 
10 Housel and Bell, pp. 91-95. 
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C. KVA IN 10 EASY STEPS 
1. Define the AS-IS Process and ensure that the sponsor concurs with the 
process as described. 
2. Conduct the Knowledge Audit 
a. Determine Actual Learning Time (ALT) 
b. Determine Nominal Learning Time (NLT) 100 units of time 
c. Determine Ordinal Ranking (Optional) Rank 1-X 
3. Determine number of organizations involved 
4. Determine number of people/organization involved 
5. Determine number of “times fired” per time period 
6. Determine “working time” for each “time fired” 
7. Determine cost per time unit for working time (if applicable) 
8. Determine NUMERATOR: 
a. ALT or NLT times 
b. Number of organizations involved times 
c. Number of people involved times 
d. Times fired 
9. Determine Denominator 
a. Time to complete times 
b. Number of people involved times 
c. Number of organizations involved times 
d. Times fired times 
e. Cost per unit of time (if applicable) 
10. Determine ROK 
a. Numerator/Denominator 
 
D.  MARKET COMPARABLES 
Market comparables are widely used in real estate where the sales price of one 
home may help determine the sales price of another home in the same neighborhood if 
the two houses are comparable.11 Some of the DOD’s processes and functions are more 
comparable to civilian organizations that generate revenue than others. A B-2 bomber 
dropping a JDAM bomb on a target in support of the war on terror is not likely to have a 
market comparable as there are no for-profit organizations that generate revenue from 
conducting such operations. On the other hand, the Air Mobility Command (AMC) has a 
close market comparable with companies like UPS and FEDEX. Both AMC and UPS 
deliver cargo via aircraft from one location to another and in some cases use very similar 
aircraft over the same routes. Both organizations have their individual costs which can be 
allocated to their processes. AMC does not generate revenue in the traditional sense like 
                                                 
11 P. Candreva, example mentioned in MN3154 class, taught at NPS, Monterey, CA, Winter 2006. 
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UPS or FEDEX, but if the AMC process that we are applying the KVA theory to has 
enough common factors as an UPS process such as similar aircraft, cargo, and the route 
flown, the revenue generated from the UPS or FEDEX process could be allocated to the 
AMC process assuming AMC would generate a similar level of revenue if it were a 
revenue generating activity. Allocating this revenue helps generate the numerator or 
benefits side of the ROK ratio in a common unit of measure, in this case dollars. 
For the analysis of VFA-14 flight scheduling and maintenance processes, the 
revenue estimate for the market comparable was obtained from a company called 
Executive Jet Management, a Net Jets company. Executive Jet Management provides 
charter air service management for small and large cabin charter corporate jets using 
fractional jet ownership of their aircraft by their clients. They estimate that a small cabin 
executive jet under their management will generate $2300 of revenue for every flight 
hour in operation.12 The 12 F/A-18 jets in the VFA-14 squadron fly approximately 4000 
hours per year total when non-deployed and conduct peace time training at their 
homeport in NAS Lemoore Ca.13 The 4000 hours times the $2300/hr revenue market 
comparable yields a $9,200,000 revenue estimate contained in the Numerator column and 
gets allocated to each of the sub processes based on their value to the overall process. 
This is not a perfect market comparable, but is a reasonable revenue estimate for a Navy 
F/A-18 squadron assuming it could generate revenue. 
The market comparables approach does not have to generate an exact comparable 
between two organizations for a KVA analysis to be conducted between the 
organizations. The $9,200,000 total annual revenue estimate was also compared to 
Executive Jet Managements estimate that 12 of their small cabin corporate jets achieved 
revenue of $12M for one year in 2004.14 The $9.2M appears to be a reasonable estimate 
for 12 Navy F/A-18 jets given that it is unlikely that a military jet could achieve the same 
level of revenue as corporate charter jets if the two types of aircraft could compete 
against each other in a for-profit environment. This conclusion was also arrived at since 
                                                 
12 Net-Jets an executive jet management company, Fractional Aircraft Ownership, 
http://www.executivejetmanagement.com/aircraft_mgmt/revenue.asp, last accessed 30 August 2006. state  
13 This estimate was obtained from personal interview conducted with VFA-14 personnel, June 2005. 
14 Net-Jets an executive jet management company, Fractional Aircraft Ownership,  
http://www.executivejetmanagement.com/aircraft_mgmt/revenue.asp. last accessed 30 August 2006.  
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an F/A-18 is more costly to schedule its missions and maintenance given the increased 
complexity of its missions and systems over a small cabin corporate jet which flies 
routine routes. 
However, there are plenty of similarities between the two organizations which 
operate jet aircraft. They both must complete the maintenance on aircraft in order to meet 
a schedule. Both organizations must complete a scheduling process that allows the 
allocation of finite resources such as personnel and equipment. The organizations also 
divide the duties of operating an aviation unit into various departments that own the 
different processes that comprise the company or squadron. Examples would be the 
existence of a maintenance department, operations/scheduling department, maintenance 
and operational administrative departments, and management or leadership personnel that 
oversee all of the processes on a daily basis. The fixed revenue figure of $9.2M would be 
allocated across all of these functions inside of both organizations.  
E. ANALYSIS OF VFA-14 SCHEDULING PROCESS 
The spreadsheet, denoted by Figure 2, is an example of the KVA methodology 
with market comparables applied to VFA-14 current flight scheduling process. The input 
values for the spreadsheet such as learning time (LT), time to complete, % IT, the number 
of persons involved in the process and who they are were obtained during a research trip 
to VFA-14. Face to face interviews were conducted with the key players of the listed sub 
processes. Direct observations of the entire process in action took place to provide further 
understanding of the “As-Is” process and ascertain the timeframe for completion. The 




Figure 2.   Market Comparable Example 
 
The ROK % calculates the value or benefits over costs ratio for each sub process 
in the flight scheduling process. The ROK % can then be used to determine which of 
these processes have the most and least value to the overall flight scheduling process so 
that changes could be made to improve upon the process. The sub processes were rank 
ordered by the VFA-14 Operations Officer based on complexity from least complex with 
the lower numbers to the most complex with the larger numbers. The complexity of the 
processes is also indicated by the actual learning time (ALT) column where the most 
complex tasks should take longer to learn. 
The correlation between these columns is 90% which is a strong indication that 
the estimates attained are accurate as to the complexity of the sub processes and the time 
it takes to learn them. The %IT column identifies how much information technology is 
used to complete the process such as a word processing program or a specialized program 
designed and implemented specifically for a sub process such as risk assessment 
program. The ROK % can either be increased by decreasing the costs of a sub process 
(the denominator) or increasing the benefits of a sub process (the numerator). Any 
proposed changes to the current process that increase the ROK percentage should be 
verified to determine if the changes actually yielded an increase in value to the overall 
process or to a specific sub processes.  
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F. EXAMINING CHANGE TO THE PROCESS 
With an analysis of the process using the KVA with market comparables 
methodology, a decision maker such as the squadron CO or the Wing Commander could 
examine the analysis and quickly determine where the most valuable and least valuable 
processes are located. The physical routing of the flight schedule for critique and 
approval has the lowest ROK% as this process is easy to learn as shown by the .5 Actual 
Learning Time (ALT), but is done by the Scheduling Officer who earns approximately 
$50,000 a year in salary. 
In order to increase the value of this sub process, a lower cost employee could be 
employed to route the schedule such as a junior enlisted member or an electronic routing 
method such as email could be implemented to do the routing. This would increase the 
%IT utilized in this sub process and decrease the time to complete the sub process as 
physically routing a schedule is much slower than routing via some type of electric 
distribution. A decision maker can play what if scenarios with the process by changing 
the numbers to reflect proposed changes and the effects they would have on the ROK 
percentages.  
The spreadsheet, denoted by Figure 3, is the same process with some proposed 
changes implemented to examine their effects on the ROK percentages and the overall 
process. The changes were selected based on several factors such as being reasonable to 
implement and if they would increase the ROK value of that sub process or the overall 
ROK ratio. 
The first change is the Assistant Operations Officer was eliminated from the flight 
scheduling process. His sub processes of building the two and one week schedules were 
given to the Scheduling Officer since these sub processes must still be performed. His 
removal also eliminated one of the critiquing/approval sub processes from the entire 
process. The second change is the increased in % IT used to perform the schedule de-
confliction by the Scheduling Officer. This assumes there is an IT capability that can 
provide this increase and is available for the Scheduling Officer to use. 
The third change is to increase the % IT used by the NATOPS Officer to check 
the schedule for NATOPS violations. The fourth change is to increase the % IT used by 
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the Training Officer to plan proficiency training that determines the scheduling of flights. 
The % IT increases for these sub processes assume the IT capability exists at no 
additional costs to the process such as a commercial off the shelf product already 
available and in use at the command, or a supported specialty program that has been 
underutilized. By implementing and using IT in processes, the affected processes will 
increase speed and the time it takes to complete them will decrease.15 This would in turn 
lower the cost of the sub process and increase its ROK %. 
The time to complete values for the affected sub processes in the spreadsheet 
below have been decreased based on this assumption. The decreased times would have to 
be measured in the actual sub process if the changes were implemented to confirm the 
estimates. The results of these changes and to the ROK percentages are contained below. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Market Comparable Example (2) 
 
The overall ROK percentage has increased from 327% to 401%. The overall cost 
of the entire process has decreased due to the elimination of the Assistant Operations 
Officer and one of his sub processes. The proposed changes appear to have an overall 
beneficial effect on the flight scheduling process; however, common sense would have to 
be applied to the changes to determine if they would make sense to implement them in 
the current process. Other organizational constraints may make any proposed changes 
unrealistic even though they made sense from a strictly financial perspective.  
                                                 
15 O. El Sawy, et al., p. 38. 
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G. LIMITATIONS OF KVA AND MARKET COMPARABLES  
The KVA methodology with market comparables approach is not without 
limitations. The first limitation is that many of the input values are based on estimates 
obtained from the responsible actors who are doing the process. If these estimates are 
incorrect due to a bias by the party giving them or the estimates were poorly measured, 
then the ROK values will be wrong leading to an incorrect analysis and faulty 
conclusions. It is human nature for one to desire protection of their job or process when 
under scrutiny. This could lead to unrealistic learning time estimates as the person under 
evaluation feels their job is so important or so difficult to learn, they provide inflated LT 
estimates to the researcher. This can be overcome if the process or job requires formal 
training that follows a standard period of education or training which provides a reliable 
unit of measurement. To the greatest extent possible, formal training evolutions were 
used as a measure of Learning Times during the research. 
The second limitation is that assumptions must be made during the analysis of the 
process. If a faulty assumption is made or the conditions surrounding the assumption 
changes, the analysis could be incorrect and lead to incorrect ROK values. An example of 
an incorrect assumption would be the flight scheduling process occurs without error day 
in and day out where there is never a need for rework due to errors or omissions. If the 
time to complete estimates were based on this assumption and it was incorrect, then the 
times to complete could be underestimated because they do not take into account the 
rework time when one of the sub processes is completed in error and must be redone. By 
assuming there is some level of rework in the processes, the average time to complete a 
sub process is higher and thus accurately reflecting the actual sub process. This 
phenomenon was overcome by an extensive interviewing process and explicit parameters 
of measurement. 
The third limitation of the methodology is the market comparables approach of 
allocating the revenue earned from a similar revenue generating process to a non-profit 
DoD process. The DoD does not generate revenue so it is difficult to allocate revenue 
across processes to determine the potential fiscal benefit of the process. The majority of 
the DoD’s processes are so unique that one may argue that no direct comparisons can be 
made with any civilian for-profit organizations even if they appear similar. The 
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comparison between AMC and UPS is an example of how even though the processes of 
delivering air cargo with similar aircraft along similar routes is highly similar, the two 
organizations costs structures and levels of efficiency are likely very different to afford a 
direct comparison.  
The KVA and the market comparables approach mitigates some of these 
arguments by noting that the approach is only as good as its assumptions and estimates, 
and that the approach calls for comparables not direct comparisons, so they do not have 
to be exact.16 The value of the approach is that even with its limitations it gives decision 
makers a method for quantifying the value from knowledge in their organizations and 
processes. When applied to DoD processes, it should not be the solely relied upon 
analysis tool before making changes to a process. Common sense and experience in 
addition to other analysis methods should be factored into the decision making process. 
H. APPLICABILITY TO DOD 
The methodology has value to DoD decision makers and resource sponsors; in 
that it is an objective analysis tool that can be utilized on nearly any Defense Department 
process to determine its complexity and the value of the overall process and its sub 
processes. The KVA methodology with market comparable approach is not meant to 
revolutionize the way DoD evaluates its processes or the decisions that should be made 
after a KVA analysis has been completed on a process. However, many times resource 
decisions are made under subjective assumptions without any analysis to support the 
decisions. Political considerations are one of the factors to blame for these non-objective 
decisions regarding what kind of defense programs to fund and what to cut.17 
An example of this, using the previously mentioned flight scheduling KVA 
analysis, is the decision to keep the Assistant Operations Officer in the flight scheduling 
process. Without the analysis, a squadron CO might conclude since the Assistant 
Operations Officer is a “good” guy, his input is valuable to the overall process and his 
contributions appear to be important. After the above KVA analysis, the same CO now 
has a more objective analysis to determine if the Assistant Operations Officer’s 
                                                 
16 Shannon P. Pratt, Robert F. Reilly, Robert P. Schweihs, 2000. Valuing a Business, p. 45. 
17 Philip J. Candreva, L. R. Jones, Armed Forces and Society, October 2005. “Congressional Control 
over Defense and Delegation of Authority in the Case of the Defense Emergency Fund,” p. 108.  
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contributions are worthwhile to the overall process or if he could be removed from the 
process and assigned other duties. KVA with market comparable helps to provide this 
objective analysis to prevent unsubstantiated decisions about whether a process should be 
eliminated, increased, or changed. 
A KVA with market comparables analysis may be useful to DoD decision makers 
to help manage the effects of across the board budget cuts mandated by major claimants 
and other resource providers. When managers are tasked with such a mandate, a KVA 
analysis may help show that a cut to a particular process is not advisable due to the high 
value of the process. The same analysis may show that if a cut has to be taken, more of 
the cut should be taken in the lower value programs and processes while protecting the 
higher value programs as shown by the analysis. The all too familiar “10% across all 
commands” cut could now be taken 25% in one command and 5% in other commands to 
achieve the same overall 10%, while protecting the most valuable processes. 
These are just some of the possibilities KVA and the market comparables 
approach could do for the DoD. The methodology would have to be more widely 
accepted across the DoD and users of the methodology would require formalized training 
in how to do a KVA analysis. The methodology would have to be developed and tailored 
for use in the DoD, but if it became a generally accepted application, it would give DoD 
managers an objective analysis tool to determine the value in DoD processes that when 
weighed against other considerations would help decision makers make the best possible 
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III. VFA-14 CASE STUDY 
A.  THE PROJECT GOAL  
The purpose of the project is to look at the current, “As-Is”, VFA-14 flight 
scheduling process driven by the Operations Department and denote how this process 
interacts with key squadron actors who have an input into this process. Once the “As-Is” 
has been fully explored and understood, Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) 
techniques will be utilized to come up with two possible solutions, an incremental “To-
Be” solution and a “Radical” solution for how the process can be improved based on the 
value of the whole process and each sub-process that goes into the generation of the flight 
schedule.  
The value of the process and sub-processes will be determined using the 
Knowledge-Value-Added (KVA) methodology authored by Dr. Housel and Bell. The 
“To-Be” solution is intended to be incremental improvements that can be implemented 
quickly and easily without a major change to the organization or the whole process; yet 
generate an immediate improvement in the value of the overall process. The “Radical” 
solution is intended to be a major paradigm shift in how the overall process is performed 
and the roles and responsibilities of each actor in the process. The “Radical” solution is 
intended to be a much more difficult solution to implement, taking longer to do, while 
calling on more techniques of BPR, but generate larger increases in the value of the 
overall process and affected sub-processes.  
Finally, the concept of a “Super-Radical” process is introduced as a direction the 
squadron scheduling process could explore to generate an even further improvement in 
the process. The “Super-Radical” is only a concept to get stakeholders and decision 
makers to think about possibilities for the future. It may not be a feasible solution to 
implement now or even in the immediate future due to technology or political constraints 
on the current process. It is meant to get stakeholders to think out of the box in order to 
foster new ideas for Business Process Reengineering.  
The research team used the Microsoft Visio program to generate the “As-Is”, “To-
Be”, “Radical”, and “Super Radical” process flow charts in order to understand the 
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current process via a visual representation and then generate a visual presentation of what 
the subsequent iterations would look like. Visio helped identify the inputs, outputs, and 
how the various actors affected these throughout the process.  
Microsoft Excel is used to generate and calculate the values for our KVA 
analysis. The KVA methodology enables us to identify and assess the value of the 
organization by putting the people and processes into common units of output. From 
these common units, performance ratios can then be calculated called the Return on 
Knowledge (ROK). With these ROK percentages, we were able to assess which people 
and sub-processes in the flight scheduling process are the most valuable and identify the 
sub-processes with the least value in order to implement BPR techniques to increase the 
value of the overall process.  
Another item worth mentioning is that just as in the actual physical boundaries of 
the Squadron, there lays a natural division between the two departments of Operations 
(OPS) and Maintenance. During the course of this research it became apparent that the 
two departments' processes would have to be looked at in parallel, at least initially. For 
simplicity's sake, the following processes associated with OPS and Maintenance will be 
described and explained in sequential order, As-Is, then the To-Be, followed by the 
Radical and Super Radical which will be discussed in the chapter regarding the use of 
Enterprise Resource Planning. 
B. THE “AS-IS” PROCESS FLOWCHART 
The “As-Is” process (the current process in place) was generated in Microsoft 
Visio and determined from the team’s experience as military officers and two of the team 
members having directly worked with similar processes. Lieutenant Colonel Means is a 
Marine Corps aviator and has dealt directly with squadron operations and maintenance 
departments in various Marine Corps and Naval aviation squadrons. Lieutenant Jackson 
previously held a billet within the Maintenance Department of VFA-14; one of the 
squadrons used to study and model this process. He was able to provide Points of Contact 
and direct insight into how the squadron’s Operation’s Department and the flight 
scheduling process worked. Further, he was instrumental in the provision of Points of 
Contact located in the squadron that underwent interviews for validating the “As-Is” 
process.  
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Once the “As-Is” process was generated by the team, a research trip was 
scheduled for the purpose of validating the “As-Is” with VFA-14 squadron personnel. 
Validation and verification of the “As-Is” process flowchart occurred through personnel 
interviews with key stakeholders in the flight scheduling process such as the Operations 
Officer, Assistant Operations Officer, Training Officer, Scheduling Officer, and 
Operations Clerk. Once these interviews were conducted and their recommendations 
were implemented the “As-Is” process flowchart for Operations was generated below in 
Figure 4. 
Figure 4 depicts the “As-Is” process flowchart the Operations department goes 
through to generate the daily flight schedule. The flight schedule takes approximately 
four hours to generate on average, but can take longer or shorter depending on 
availability of personnel, last minute changes, and rework. The overall process appears 
simple, however, its largely manual nature and redundancies cause it to execute in a less 
than optimal manner. 
The main input to the schedule is a generic flight requirement. A flight 
requirement can be in many different forms and come from a variety of sources internal 
and external to the squadron. The box labeled “Inputs to Writing Schedule” contain all 
the main categories of a flight requirement input. These inputs all go to the Scheduling 
Officer (Scheds-O). The Schedules Officer will review the inputs and use them to 
generate the rough schedule. He must balance and de-conflict all of the flight 
requirements into an achievable schedule that will sustain a quality review by his 
superiors.  
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Figure 4.   Operations Dept. Flowchart 
 
Once the rough schedule is completed it is reviewed by the Assistant Operations 
Officer and the Operations Officer department head. It is then forwarded to the 
Commanding Officer for review and overall approval. The rough schedule is a paper 
schedule generated from a Microsoft Word template and is routed to the reviewing and 
approving personnel personally by the Schedules Officer. Delays and rework can occur if 
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the reviewing and approving personnel detect errors in the schedule or omissions of flight 
requirements causing the Schedules Officer to go back to his work area, correct the 
deficiency and generate a new rough schedule. 
A delay can also occur in the routing and approval of the schedule if one of the 
key actors in not available to perform their critique or approval. The Schedules Officer 
must then wait for this person to become available causing a delay to the entire process. 
Once the schedule is approved by the Commanding Officer, it is copied and distributed 
throughout the squadron and used as the plan for the next day’s flight operations. The 
entire current process of producing a quality assured schedule is captured in the “As-Is” 
KVA spreadsheet depicted in Figure 5.  
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“AS-IS” KVA SPREADSHEET 
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The “As-Is” KVA spreadsheet identifies the responsible actors and the sub-
processes each actor is responsible for executing in order to generate the daily flight 
schedule. The assumptions the team is working with are listed below the spreadsheet. The 
input values to the spreadsheet such as Learning Time (LT), percent of Information 
Technology used (%IT), and Time to Complete were obtained from a combination of 
personal interviews conducted in person, via email, and via phone conversations with the 
actors in the flight scheduling process and the team’s own experience with flight 
scheduling processes for a Navy aviation squadron.  
The ROK % calculates the value or benefits over costs ratio for each sub-process 
in the flight scheduling process. The ROK % can then be used to determine which of 
these processes have the most and least value to the overall flight scheduling process so 
that BPR techniques can be used to improve upon the process. The rank order of the sub-
processes, as given to the team from the VFA-14 Operations Officer, lists the processes 
based on complexity from least complex as denoted by lower numbers, to most complex 
as denoted by the larger numbers. The complexity of the processes is also indicated by 
the actual learning time (ALT) column where the most complex tasks should take longer 
to learn. The correlation between these columns is 90% which is a strong indication that 
the estimates attained are accurate as to the complexity of the sub-processes and the time 
it takes to learn them.  
The %IT column identifies how Information Technology is used to complete the 
process; such as a word processing program or a specialized program designed and 
implemented specifically for a process such as a risk assessment program. The processes 
generally have a low IT percentage which could indicate a good opportunity to 
implement more IT into the process and possibly increase the ROK %. The ROK % can 
either be increased by decreasing the costs of the process (the denominator) or increasing 
the benefits of the process (the numerator). The proposed changes to the “As-Is” process 
that increase the ROK percentage would have to be tested to determine if the changes 
actually yielded and increase in value to the overall process or specific sub-processes. 
This is beyond the scope of this project and will not be measured. 
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The team came up with a revenue estimate using the Market Comparables 
approach. This allowed us to use the common and readily identifiable units of dollars in 
our numerator and denominator calculations to attain our ROK ratio. The revenue figure 
was attained from a company called Executive Jet Management, a Net-Jets company. The 
exact figures and the method utilized in the case study were discussed earlier in the 
Market Comparable section. As a reminder, the team utilized fixed revenue of $9.2M 
annually. The math used was $2300 of revenue per hour multiplied by the number of 
aircraft in the squadron, (12) F/A-18s. The squadron flies an average of 4000 hours per 
annum. 4000(hrs) X $2300 = $9.2M. 
The following paragraphs describe the current processes as we discovered them to 
be after visiting the VFA-14 maintenance department during our research. Figure 6 
depicts the “As-Is” process within the Maintenance Department. This process is one that 
occurs daily proportionally in support of the execution of the daily flight schedule in the 
form of unscheduled maintenance with the balance of the processes supporting 
previously scheduled maintenance.  
The timeframe associated with the execution of the flight schedule, as far as the 
Maintenance Department is concerned, usually lasts about 24 hours on average. The 
beginning point is from the time that the current schedule was initially signed, until the 
next subsequent schedule is approved by the Commanding Officer.  
The overall processes of the Maintenance Department, as is the case with the 
Operations Department, encompass more personnel and a greater number of operations 
than appears in the process of creating a flight schedule. However, similar to the 
processes used by the Operations Department involved in the creation of a flight 
schedule, the Maintenance Department processes also appear to be largely manual in 
nature. The fact that there are a substantially greater amount of processes increases the 
amount of human effort required, as well as the odds for creating larger returns with the 
implementation of refined business processes.  
The Maintenance Department can be described as being in a reactionary role to 
the flight requirements as set by the Operations Department (OPS) within a squadron. 
Normally, OPS will collaborate with the Maintenance Department at least once, maybe 
29 
even several times during the creation of a daily schedule in order to obtain a clear idea 
of whether or not there will be an adequate supply of aircraft available for the flight 
events that are being scheduled for the following day. In all instances though, all of the 
Maintenance Department efforts are concentrated upon meeting the future objectives as 
set forth by the Operations Department. There may, however, occasionally be instances 
when the objectives of a daily flight schedule are not able to be met. Additionally, rarely 
does a flight schedule ever execute that does not require several adjustments to be made 
to the published document.  
In reference to the Maintenance Department flowchart (Figure 6), the input to the 
maintenance process begins with the approval of a flight schedule by the CO. Copies of 
the approved flight schedule in the current (As-Is) state of operations are normally hand-
delivered to the Maintenance Department by the Operations Department. Distribution of 
the approved schedule amongst the Maintenance Department personnel includes 
everyone from the Maintenance Officer down to the each shop supervisor. It is not 
unusual to have to manually distribute as many as 25 hard-copies of the flight schedule 
throughout the Maintenance Department on a daily basis; a process that consumes a large 
amount of human and material resources. The flight schedule that is distributed pertains 
to the events that will occur the following day and serves as one of the primary inputs to 
the before-shift maintenance meeting. 
Maintenance meetings are physically conducted prior to the beginning of each 
work shift. Most regular fleet squadrons conduct two maintenance shifts per day and 
these two shifts are commonly referred to as Day Check and Night Check.  
Normally, the freshly approved schedule for the following day, when completed 
in time, will be part of the maintenance meeting in the sense that priorities will be set for 
which aircraft are to be concentrated on regarding the level of work effort. If the flight 
schedule isn't signed prior to the maintenance meeting, it simply comes into play when it 
is completed, and the Maintenance Control Chief Petty Officers (CPOs) will adjust the 




“As-Is” Process Flowchart (Maintenance Department) 
 




The maintenance day begins with the commencement of the morning maintenance 
meeting. This meeting is proctored by the maintenance CPOs, and is attended by all 
maintenance division CPOs, work-center supervisors, the Maintenance Master Chief 
Petty Officer (MMCPO), the Maintenance/Material Control Officer (MMCO), and 
occasionally the Maintenance Officer (MO). During this meeting, the flight schedule is 
discussed and a plan of action to ensure its successful execution is formulated. Normally 
squadrons tend to fly 12 sorties per day in a training environment with planes departing 
in groups of three or four at a time. During the maintenance meeting, the goal of the 
planning evolution is to provide just enough planes to satisfy the requirements and 
balancing that with the remaining planes that maintenance action needs to be performed 
on. Additionally, plans for refueling and inspections between flights are finalized. 
The maintenance meeting itself has very little IT involved. Essentially the only IT 
involved with the meeting is that of a computer printout of each work-centers current 
workload. This type of IT supplied information is indicative of just about all of the IT 
within the Maintenance Department. In other words, the IT is essentially giving back to 
you exactly what you put into it, there is little value added to the information as a result 
of the current type of IT being used within the squadron. 
In addition to the flight schedule, there are other maintenance-specific 
requirements that are taken into account during the conduct of the maintenance meeting 
as well. These are known as scheduled and un-scheduled maintenance requirements. 
Scheduled requirements are those maintenance-related requirements that are part of a pre-
established regimen based upon calendar or hourly intervals. These maintenance 
schedules are strictly adhered to on a daily basis and are always taken into account 
throughout the maintenance workday. Unscheduled inspections are exactly as they sound, 
they are not scheduled events. An example of unscheduled maintenance could be 
anything that occurs during a flight, such as a landing gear problem that generates and 
unexpected maintenance requirement. Other examples would be the resulting 
maintenance action required due to an aircraft experiencing a hard landing or other 
unforeseen circumstances. 
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With the approved schedule and inputs regarding scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance, the maintenance meeting can be finished. As stated, the primary goals of 
the meeting are to discuss and formulate the plan for the successful execution of the flight 
schedule and secondarily to devise the plan for the completion of whatever maintenance 
priorities there are for that day.  
The key to the successful management of the Maintenance Department depends 
heavily upon the balancing of scheduled flight requirements with that of the squadron's 
maintenance requirements, most of which happens with a relatively small amount of IT 
support in the current state. 
C. MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT ACTORS 
At this point in time it is necessary to discuss the main personnel that make up the 
decision loop within the Maintenance Department. Figure 7 depicts the hierarchical 
structure of the Maintenance Department in a Navy aircraft squadron as stated in the 
OPNAV 4790 (series) manual.18  
The Maintenance Officer (MO) is the officer that is in charge of, and is 
responsible for the overall accomplishment of the Maintenance Department's mission. 
Typically, in a Navy squadron, the MO is either an aviator or naval flight officer, 
normally a mid-grade Lieutenant Commander completing their department head tour. 
Additionally, the position of MO is usually a prerequisite to the position of OPSO as 
well, in order to allow the OPSO the opportunity to observe first hand the processes 




                                                 
18 This manual, commonly referred to as “the 4790,” is the primary source of Naval Aviation 
Maintenance doctrine. Within it, all aspects of policies and procedures related to the management of Naval 
Aviation Maintenance activities are discussed. 
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Figure 7.   VFA-14 Maintenance Department Organizational Structure 
 
Of note, the position of Assistant Maintenance Officer (AMO) was not considered 
to be an important position regarding the decision making process within the realm of the 
operational side of a Navy Maintenance Department. Although technically able to make 
“MO-level” decisions in the absence of the MO, the position of AMO is one that is 
administrative in nature. The AMO deals primarily with the management of various 
maintenance-related administrative programs, as well as maintenance related manpower 
issues.  
Falling under the MO and AMO in the command structure is the position of 
Maintenance/Material Control Officer (MMCO). The position of MMCO is normally 
filled by a mid-grade Lieutenant or below including Warrant Officers, and is considered 
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to be the position within the Maintenance Department that is most critical to its success. 
Whereas the MO holds the overall responsibility for what happens within the 
Maintenance Department, MMCO is the positional billet that operates mainly within the 
finer details of the maintenance and flight schedule execution process.  
Under the MMCO is the Maintenance Master Chief Petty Officer (MMCPO). The 
MMCPO, not to be confused with the Command Master Chief Petty Officer (CMC), 
provides a sound knowledge base within the Maintenance Department that supplements 
the knowledge of the MMCO, the MO as well as the other CPOs within the department. 
Being the senior enlisted within the Maintenance Department, the MMCPO brings an 
average of 23-plus years of experience to the department that are crucial to the daily 
execution of all squadron maintenance functions.  
The previously discussed positions (MO, AMO, MMCO and MMCPO) make up 
the senior level management structure within the Maintenance Department. Below that 
level lies what is referred to as Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control is the hub for 
all that happens within the Maintenance Department. All squadron maintenance actions 
are initiated by the Chief Petty Officers that work there, from scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance to coordination of the physical execution of the flight schedule. Normally 
the people that make up Maintenance Control are mid-to-senior level Chief Petty Officers 
with previous experience as maintenance work center supervisors.  
The last actor that was used in our research of the As-Is process was categorized 
as simply Maintenance Control, essentially capturing the efforts of those that work in 
conjunction with the Maintenance Control CPOs. The official Navy title of these actors 
are Aviation Maintenance Administration-men, and they are responsible for maintaining 
virtually all of the paperwork associated with being a controlling custodian of the aircraft. 
The “As-Is” Maintenance KVA depicted on the spreadsheet in Figure 8, below 
lists each previously mentioned actor within the maintenance department and their 
respective duties, or sub-processes, that they are responsible for in the execution effort of 
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As previously mentioned, the assumptions the team is working with are listed on 
the spreadsheet and values listed on the spreadsheet such as Learning Time (LT), percent 
of IT utilization in the respective sub-process (%IT), and Time to Complete. All of the 
values presented in the spreadsheet DoD were obtained from a combination of personal 
interviews with the aforementioned leadership billets in the VFA-14 Maintenance 
Department, publicly available published information, and utilization of the research 
teams' own experience on the subject. Figure 9 depicts the formal training time for a 
typical naval aviation maintenance department. 
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Length of formal training required for maintenance shop personnel (not Line Division)
A-Schools CNATTU Total Average Training Required = 72 Days
8 44 or
















Length of formal training required for Line Division personnel (not shop personnel)
A-Schools CNATTU Total Average Training Required = 16 Days
0 16 PC Training or
0 16 128 Hours
Allocate 60/40 to Daily/Turnaround Inspection respectively (in hours) = 77 and 51
Length of formal training required for Maintenance Control CPOs (not M/C shop personnel)
CNATTU
12 SUPERFAM





Length of formal training required for Maintenance Material Control Officers
NASC Whiting Field
48 days average for AMO School (two programs, 1 @ 70 Days and 1@ 25 days)
48 days = 380 hours
Length of formal training required for Maintenance Control Master Chief
CNATTU
12 days C-600-3210(gives 8800 nec)
Length of formal training required for Maintenance Control Personnel




Figure 9.   Maintenance Formal Training 
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Values given for formal learning times (LT) within the Maintenance Department 
were obtained from information regarding the required training for each of the actors in 
order to perform the processes of the billet held. This does not mean that they have not 
had additional formal training after assuming the billet, but that these values represent the 
minimum amount in hours of training required for assumption of the position. Although, 
for simplicity's sake it was not accounted for, in some cases there are individuals called 
Strikers that perform mostly OJT in lieu of formal training for the position. For the 
purposes of our research, the individuals referred to would have attended the required 
school for non-striker personnel.  
The As-Is spreadsheet provides a baseline for the efficiency level for each of the 
current processes occurring within the Maintenance Department. As is the case with the 
flight scheduling process, the percent Return on Knowledge (% ROK) is a calculated 
ratio of benefits over cost for each of the sub-processes performed by an actor in the 
Maintenance Department in support of the execution of the flight schedule.  
The % ROK column in the spreadsheet provides us with visual determinations of 
which of the actor/sub-process combinations provide the least amount of overall value to 
the flight schedule execution process within the Maintenance Department. A visual 
determination of the ROK gives us a realistic view of the sub-process and its overall 
benefit using knowledge as a basis of measurement. From this, processes may be 
reorganized along with the introduction of IT so that the maximum Return On Investment 
(ROI) is achieved within the organization.  
The rank order of the maintenance sub-processes was provided to the team from a 
combination of actors; the VFA-14 MO, the MMCO, and the MMCPO. The rank order 
column lists the processes based on complexity from least complex to most complex. The 
values in this column may be described by stating that the lesser complex processes are 
represented by a lower number and the more complex processes are represented by a 
higher number. 
The relative complexity of these sub-processes are also indicated by the actual 
learning time (ALT) column, with the idea being that the most complex tasks should take 
longer to learn and lesser complex tasks not requiring as much learning time. The 
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correlation between these columns is 90% which is a strong indication that the estimates 
attained are accurate as to the complexity of the sub-processes and the time it takes to 
learn them.  
D. OUR SOLUTIONS 
The research team came up with two solutions or changes to the “As-Is” process 
that would increase the overall ROK% of the entire flight scheduling process. The first 
solution is called the Incremental “To-Be” solution. The “To-Be” is designed to be easy 
and quick to implement into the “As-Is” process without much redesign. The positive 
side of this solution is that the pain that can come with change should be very low to the 
squadron as this solution is implemented. The drawback to this solution is that it affords 
only a minor increase in the overall ROK percentage to the flight scheduling process. 
This is a realistic and feasible solution if VFA-14 wants to make a slight improvement for 
their flight scheduling process that can be implemented without much difficulty or 
disruption to their overall process.  
It is assumed that the “To-Be” solution could be implemented in the squadron 
with the least amount of disruption, least cost, and least effort. This solution could be 
implemented utilizing the current IT support available in the squadron.  
The second possible solution involving a more pronounced change to the process 
model and requiring Business Process Engineering is called the “Radical” solution as 
depicted in Figure 10. The radical solution is based on an assumption of acceptance of 
BPR by the squadron and its personnel. All assumptions used to create the spreadsheet 
for the Radical are listed below the outcomes on the spreadsheet. The Radical KVA 
spreadsheet is discussed in further detail under the Radical subheading during the 
discussion of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). 
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“RADICAL” KVA SPREADSHEET 
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E. BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING 
In recent times, with the advent of the information age and its effects on the way 
the Department of Defense operates on a day-to-day basis, along with the requirement for 
quicker processing of increasingly greater information, the utilization of Information 
Technology as a viable solution has found its niche within the structure of the Navy.  
The requirement of implementing an IT solution within any organization 
conforms to the notion that processes will be affected in some way. Most times, the 
processes within an organization are in need of some improvement, if that was not the 
case, then there would be no use for the implementation of IT. In virtually every case 
where an automated process is to be replaced or augmented by a form of computerized 
technology, a requirement for alteration of current practices presents itself.  
In the early 1980s, the ideas having to do with the implementation of Information 
Technology had begun to wane in popularity. It seemed that large amounts of money 
were being spent, with increasingly smaller amounts of return on its investment being 
realized. Several articles were published during that period that attempted to explain this 
phenomena, and researchers began to find during their analyses was in many instances, 
although the effort being made to implement the IT into current processes was successful, 
the very idea of doing so was the inherent problem. In other words, the realization 
became apparent that fundamental business processes needed to be changed prior to the 
introduction of any IT solution within an organization in order to help ensure success.  
In 1993, a book published by Michael Hammer and James Champy was one of 
the first to make use of the term BPR, or Business Processes Review.19 This book 
emphasized the idea that a reorganization of business practices was essential in 
organizations that were experiencing poor levels of performance. Following the 
publishing of their book and others like it, the benefits of BPR when coupled with 
implementation of IT solutions became increasingly better known, and during the 1990s 
it eventually became a standard business practice. 
                                                 
19 M. Hammer, J. Champy: Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution. 1st 
ed. Harper Business, New York, NY (1993), last accessed January 2006. 
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The following diagram20 Figure 11, depicts the BPR process redesign phase within an 
organization. The process of conducting a business process re-design consists of 
essentially three phases; the scoping process, the modeling, analysis and re-design 
process, and the integrating planning process.  
 
 













Figure 11.   Business Process Review (BPR) Redesign Phase (From: El Sawy, 2001) 
 
Each of the phases can be broken down into areas having to do with key tasks, 
deliverables and the identification of key participants within the organization. According 
to El Sawy, the phases required for any process reengineering effort is conducted as 
follows. 
Phase one, the scoping process, involves such key tasks as identifying process 
boundaries and the key process issues. It is important that in this phase one understand 
the best practices of the organization, familiarize participants with the notion of BPR 
software and its capabilities, as well as to outline a plan for the collection of data and the 
formulation of the baseline. This phase would include a deliverable of a process scoping 
                                                 
20 Omar A. El Sawy, Redesigning Enterprise Processes for e-Business, McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2001. 
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report and would involve such key participants as the process owners, the customers of 
the process, and the BPR implementation team. This phase ends with a plan for the 
modeling phase. 
Phase 2, the modeling, analysis and redesign of the process phase begins with the 
development of a baseline called the “As-Is”. In this phase, the “As-Is” process is 
analyzed and diagnosed. From there, a “To-be model identifying process alternatives is 
developed. Analysis of the “To-be” is conducted and the best alternative is chosen. 
Finally, a software-based process model is developed and a process reengineering report 
is generated.  
In phase 3, any alternative options are weighed, and any required adjustment of 
the process design is conducted, and a plan for process implantation is formulated. The 
final deliverable for all three phases is a process integration plan. 
The main change in the “To-Be” process flowchart is the elimination of the 
Assistant Operations Officer actor in the process. This reduces the number of personnel 
who make inputs into the daily flight schedule and who review and critique the rough 
schedule before it reaches the Commanding Officer. The Assistant Operations Officer 
sub-process of critiquing and reviewing the daily flight schedule is eliminated and the 
sub-processes of building the two and one week schedules is now being done by the 
Schedules Officer who can complete these sub-processes at a lower cost thanks to a lower 
annual salary. This generates an overall cost savings to the entire process with a lower 
overall denominator which will be shown below in the “To-Be” spreadsheet.  
F. “TO-BE” PROCESS FLOWCHART 
The “To-Be” process flowchart contained in Figure 12 depicts the incremental 
changes to the process. 
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Figure 12.   To-Be Flowchart 
 
The additional changes the “To-Be” implements are an increased use of IT by the 
Schedules Officer for the collaboration of the inputs to generate the rough flight schedule. 
This can be implemented using stand alone Microsoft products such as email and excel or 
in house developed programs to assist the Schedules Officer in receiving and de-
conflicting the inputs for the flight schedule. Another change would be to increase the 
percentage of IT used by the NATOPS and Training officer for their four sub-processes 
that utilize IT. 
Their processes are relatively straight forward and stable, but are currently using a 
low amount of IT to complete. An increase in IT could be realistically achieved to 
facilitate the completion of their processes and increase the overall value of these sub-
processes. This change in IT is not captured on the “To-Be” process flowchart since the 
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inputs required for the process remains the same, but will be indicated on the “To-Be” 
KVA spreadsheet as the process parameters will change, e.g. time to complete will 
decrease due to the increase in % IT being utilized. The “To-Be” KVA spreadsheet 
capturing all of the changes suggested and their effects are depicted below in Figure 10. 
The “To-Be” spreadsheet, Figure 13, shows the elimination of the Assistant Ops 
Officer to the flight scheduling process which eliminated his critiquing and approval of 
the rough flight schedule sub-process. The increases to the IT percentages are also shown 
for the Training Officer’s and NATOPS Officers sub-processes which increased their 
ROK percentages. The overall increase in ROK for the whole process went up to 669% 
from the “AS-IS” total percent of 526%. This is a realistic increase in overall ROK % 
from the incremental changes made to the “AS-IS” process which are reflected in the 
“TO-BE” spreadsheet and flowchart. 
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“TO-BE” KVA SPREADSHEET 
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The Maintenance “To-Be” flowchart depicted in Figure 14 shows the elimination 
of three tasks held by the Maintenance Officer in the “As-Is” scenario. Upon our 
investigation of the way the squadron operates within the Maintenance Department, we 
discovered that there is quite a bit of duplication of effort regarding certain tasks. As a 
disclaimer to the way the military operates and for the sake of research, we decided to 
eliminate some of these tasks that are duplicative in nature, but realize that for these 
changes to actually be incorporated, it would require a significant change in established 
policy.  
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The first change that we incorporated for the Maintenance Officer was to take 
away the subtask of long-range planning of maintenance actions, as this task is already 
performed by the MMCO. The 4790 states that the MMCO shall keep the MO advised of 
the overall workload and material situations as it affects the Maintenance Department.21 
Although the MO is overall responsible for the department, his responsibilities to the 
department are on a rather high level, thus our reasoning for leaving the long-range 
maintenance planning as primarily an MMCO responsibility. In reality that is not too far 
fetched- the MO primarily acts as an advisor to the MMCO on a high level, providing the 
direction, with the MMCO developing the plans. 
Next, we decided to also make the task of de-conflicting aircraft availability 
versus flight requirements a task exclusively one that is performed by the MMCO. In all 
cases, the MMCO is the one performing this task anyway, so this task is really one that is 
especially duplicative in nature. The MO rarely gets “in the weeds” concerning day-to-
day, flight-to-flight decisions unless something happens that severely disrupts the 
execution of the flight schedule. It is understood that the MMCOs professional 
background and support staff is more than adequate in ensuring that de-confliction of 
aircraft versus flight requirements happens in an accurate and timely manner. 
Regarding the rest of the actors within the Maintenance Department (MMCO, 
MMCPO, Maintenance Control CPOs, and Maintenance Control Personnel) we were not 
able to justify the elimination of any additional tasks in the to-be scenario. We were, 
however, able to affect the “To-Be” by increasing the amount of IT involved with almost 
all of the tasks in the “To-Be” scenario.  
Relatively speaking, the Maintenance Department as a whole is largely an 
organization that depends on little automation in order to function. Historically, the 
Maintenance Department in a squadron has relied on carbon-copy forms for virtually all 
of its maintenance documentation. It wasn't until the early 1990's, with the introduction of 
the Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System 
(NALCOMIS), that there was any automation to the process within the department at all. 
Even with the introduction of NALCOMIS, there is still a relatively minute amount of 
                                                 
21 4790 Vol. 1 Chapter 11, p. 13. 
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useful IT within Navy aircraft squadrons. Only now, as of this publication, is a newer 
Windows-based version of NALCOMIS undergoing testing in select squadrons with a 
fleet-wide release that is still unknown. 
In the “To-Be” scenario, we believe the percentage of IT could readily be 
increased in the following areas.  
1. Maintenance Officer 
The current “As-Is” state of the department head meeting relies on virtually little, 
if any IT. It is feasible to believe that the process could easily undergo some update 
involving automation using collaborative technologies such as virtual meetings. These 
technologies allow for more accurate processing and dissemination of information (i.e. 
the meeting minutes) as a result of the meeting as well as the ability to conduct remote 
meetings when the need arises. 
2. MMCO and MMCPO 
The MMCO and the MMCPO both utilize little IT in the “As-Is” scenario. 
NALCOMIS is the only program other than commercially available software such as 
Microsoft Excel that are currently being used to document and maintain maintenance 
specific tasks and events. Certain tasks that both of these actors perform will likely never 
benefit from a large percentage of IT, such as the tasks involving direct supervision of 
maintenance personnel. 
One item that was discovered during our research was that some of the squadrons 
are using at least one proprietary program, a Microsoft Access Database, for use in 
tracking several things ranging from personnel information and qualifications to the 
monitoring of a worker's Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) status. From our research, 
we ascertained that the database was assembled by a Maintenance Officer for his own 
personal use some time ago and has since been passed around to different squadrons. 
This indicates an active desire for an IT solution that may possibly be going unanswered 
by the Navy at this time.  
The use of proprietary software in this situation causes a couple of problems. The 
software is not approved for use by the Navy, and uses personal information (e.g. social 
security numbers) which is being stored in an unsecured environment. Secondly, 
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although the use of a database for storing this kind of information allows for quick search 
methods, the fact that all of the databases are stand-alone is a limiting factor. An ideal 
situation would have a central portal that all squadrons at the same base, or in the same 
air wing, could access and be allowed permissions to retrieve and enter their information 
into a commonly shared database. 
3. Maintenance Control Chief Petty Officers 
The Maintenance Control Chief Petty Officer (CPO) billet is a key function 
within the Maintenance Department and currently utilizes the greatest percentage of IT in 
the current “As-Is” environment. However, similar to the MMCO and MMCPO, the 
Maintenance CPO utilizes NALCOMIS almost exclusively. In fact, we discovered that 
the Maintenance CPO always has one eye on the NALCOMIS terminal and one on a 
white board labeled with such things as colored arrows that indicate various conditions 
such as the status of each particular aircraft. Although the Maintenance Control CPO 
utilizes the greatest percentage of IT, relatively speaking, he is also relying on the 
greatest percentage of manual processes as well. The fact that a greater percentage of IT 
is being used is directly counteracted by the prevalent use of manual processes. The 
Maintenance Control CPO billet needs a suitable IT solution that will combine the 
multitude of current processes into a single process so that all of the relevant information 
is available with the least amount of effort. 
4. Maintenance Control 
This actor/billet category exists as a direct support function to the Maintenance 
Control CPO. During our interviews with the members of this work-center, we 
discovered that although these individuals are responsible for the upkeep and 
maintenance of NALCOMIS, they are burdened with a responsibility that could benefit 
the most from an introduction of an IT solution.  
The sub-process of maintaining the aircraft logbooks is without a doubt the most 
burdensome position within the maintenance “front office”. This process involves the 
manual use of an electric typewriter to make entries into each of the 12 aircraft logbooks 
on a daily basis. We provide a rather conservative estimate in our dataset that indicates an 
average of 90 entries per week is made.  
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Compliance of technical directives is the most labor intensive process for any 
logbook clerk working in Maintenance Control. Spanning categories within a logbook 
that include such items as the records associated with a myriad of aircraft components, or 
the items such as the mandatory compliance of Airframe ,Power-plant, Avionics, and 
Software engineering changes to the aircraft. A logbook clerk may have to annotate 
hundreds of this type of entries in each logbook. On of the largest areas of concern in any 
squadron is the annotation of compliance with Technical Directives, or TDs. Currently 
for the F/A-18E, the Navy's newest strike fighter jet, there are literally thousands of these 
TDs that have to be accounted for on each of the 12 aircraft that the squadron is 
responsible for.  
These TDs are important because they relay instructions regarding the inspection 
and/or repair of items that manufacturing engineers have identified as important to the 
safety of the aircraft. Not only is the compliance with these TDs mandatory, their 
accuracy in reporting is as well. Since the annotation of compliance with TDs into the 
logbook is the job of the logbook clerk within the Maintenance Department, the lack of 
IT in the current state lends itself to the potential for errors, not to mention increased time 
to perform the manual process. 
G. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ALL MODELS 
Figure 15 depicts the differences in two of the models, As-Is and the To-Be, and 
provides a visualization of all the changes that took place in an easy to ready side by side 
format. The Radical and the Super Radical will be discussed and depicted in later 
chapters dealing with the use of Enterprise Resource Planning. 
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IV. ENTERPRISE RESOURCE PLANNING 
A. IMPLEMENTING A SUCCESSFUL ERP 
There are many important factors that must be considered when striving to 
achieve a successful ERP implementation into an organization. Three of the most 
important factors that an organization, whether it be the DoD or civilian, should 
concentrate on are the following: (1) A prepared organization accepting of the new 
change (2) A capable implementation team empowered to be flexible and implement the 
ERP rapidly, and (3) a focus on integration with the current and legacy ERP systems it 
will function with.  
Assuming the organization has the infrastructure and IT staff to support the new 
ERP system, the organization must prepare itself for the new system through education 
and training of its employees. An ERP tool calls for a change in the way an organization 
does business. People, especially DoD personnel, can be very resistant to the change 
brought on by an ERP system. The organization must be sold on the value of the new 
system and its personnel must be trained in its use or it could sit as an unused icon on 
their desktop. This kind of buy-in starts from the top with the CO/XO and department 
heads supporting the new system and ensuring the training of the organizational layers 
below them. As the new system comes online, the leaders of the organization must ensure 
the new system is the only acceptable way of doing business from that point on; 
otherwise resisters to the change may work around the new program to avoid learning 
and using the ERP system. An ERP mission planning system to generate flight schedules 
in a squadron would not be widely accepted if the “old” chiefs of the squadron were 
allowed to continue to generate flight schedules using a previous manual method. 
A second key factor to a successful ERP implementation is an implementation 
team who has the authority to make decisions and the ability to complete the installation 
of the system before the command or organization stops supporting the project. A 
common cause of ERP failures is the cost and time involved with the implementation, 
causing the organization to give up on the project before they have a chance to realize the 
benefits from the new system. An ERP implementation team needs to recognize this risk 
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and mitigate it by executing a plan that will install the system and train the users on 
schedule and on budget before the organization loses faith in the new system. This team 
should be the system experts consisting of members from the organization and the 
outside entity providing the program to the command. Once the install is complete, the 
internal members will still be around to train users and support the value of the ERP 
when the external team members are gone. The team should have authority from the 
command to make decisions and changes regarding installation to overcome problems as 
quickly as possible and stay on schedule. 
The third factor to achieving a successful ERP implementation is to concentrate 
on the integration of the new system with legacy systems. Integration concerns are some 
of the biggest challenges with the implementation of an ERP system. An ERP system 
must function seamlessly with legacy systems while executing the new processes it is 
designed to do. With all the different stove piped systems in the DoD’s existence, this is a 
challenging task for an ERP system that must function across the DoD or even just the 
Navy. 
The Global Transportation Network (GTN) is an example of an ERP that was 
implemented DoD wide to attain total asset visibility of material in the Defense 
Transportation System using a Transportation Control Number (TCN) as primary DoD 
input. This system had to pull data from all of the services organic material management 
and tracking programs as well as from civilian shipping companies like FEDEX and feed 
it into the GTN website. The databases of all these systems were each likely developed 
and coded uniquely and without much thought of integration as they were designed as 
stand alone systems. 
The challenge of ERP integration is to recognize all these varying systems and 
data fields and be able to interpret them into the system without any compatibility issues. 
With all the possible combinations available to databases past and present, this could 
become a programming nightmare and illustrates the difficulty in getting different ERP 
systems to function with each other. Successful ERP integration between such systems 
removes these cross functional barriers and allows the information shared between them 
to be transferred seamlessly and efficiently.  
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Although there are many factors that must be considered for ERP implementation, 
an organization prepared and ready for ERP change, a solid implementation team and 
process, and successful integration with legacy systems are three of the key focal points 
for an organization to successfully implement an ERP solution into their processes. These 
areas will help an organization effectively manage the risk and get the process right the 
first time around. 
The research team examined a real world example of the use of an ERP to 
facilitate aviation operations in an actual squadron. Currently the Israeli Armed Forces 
utilize a product from the Xvionics Corporation to aid in their daily decision making 
processes in a squadron that routinely flies actual bombing/attack missions on actual 
adversaries. The Israeli maintenance processes are shown in Figure 16. These processes 





Figure 16.   Israeli Maintenance 
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The Israeli Air Force uses Xvionics program XV-OMS 3.0 to conduct mission 
planning and to generate their flight schedules. The XV-OMS 3.0 is an ERP and Decision 
Support System (DSS) program specifically designed to support command and control 
operations at the wing and squadron level. The program is in use in all thirty-five 
squadrons of the Israeli Air Force and has helped to reduce operating costs by 
approximately 25%, increase operational and combat efficiencies by approximately 
125%, and has improved overall squadron safety.22 The actors, processes and associated 
data are used as the input to generate the Navy maintenance radical figure. The Navy 
maintenance radical figure is a redesigned view of a Navy squadron’s maintenance 
department with data and processes from the Israeli Air Force used as input. This is 
designed to show what a Navy aviation squadron’s maintenance department would look 
like if it were using an ERP program like Xvionics XV-OMS 3.0 and the improvements 
gained in the ROK ratios. The Israeli maintenance figure and it data were obtained from a 
former active duty Israeli Air Force officer, Mr. Gamliel “Jicko” Shitrit. Mr. Shitrit 
served several operational tours in the Israeli Air Force up to the Executive Officer level 
and now works for Xvionics Inc. as the Director of Engineering. 
B. IMPLEMENTING A “RADICAL” PROCESS CHANGE 
In the case study of VFA-14 one is able to view how much further the 
implementation of an IT solution can be taken in the creation of efficiency. In addition to 
the To-Be solution, the team came up with a Radical and a Super Radical solution that 
involve increasing dependence upon IT to complete the processes inside of a U.S. Naval 
aviation squadron. When comparing the radical process flowchart with the “As-Is”, the 
main changes can be found by viewing the main character changes that occurred in the 
Figure 17  flowchart depicted below. 
Of note is the elimination of two characters that were heavily involved in 
supporting the business process through manual means with limited IT support. The 
Assistant Operations Officer and the Schedules Officer have been eliminated in favor of 
increasing the usage of IT in the process. This represents Business Process Engineering 
(BPR) via the incorporation of an Enterprise Resource Planning tool. The elimination of 
                                                 
22 Xvionics Corporation, Xvionics fact sheet, p. 1. 
http://www.xvionics.com/downloads/XVionics_factsheet.pdf, last accessed 14 August 2006. 
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the two positions would save the unit approximately $130,000.00 in annual salary that 
would have been paid to the two positions. The BPR would require a change in the 
processes to fit the new ERP vice trying to make the ERP support the old processes. The 
end result or output is a signed and quality assured flight schedule that can be used to 
drive the squadron’s mission requirements.  
 
 
Figure 17.   Radical Flowchart 
 
The Radical represents a vast departure from the “old” way of doing business as it 
allows many of the input functions that were provided by the Schedules Officer to be 
generated automatically when “requirement to fly” information is entered into the system 
by the Operations Officer and Training Officer. It further acts as a quasi Decision 
Support System in that it churns the input information and checks it against If-then code 
to provide the quality assurance viewpoint that was previously provided by the Assistant 
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Operations Officer. The Radical leaves the Operations Officer in place in order to assure 
quality information is entered into the ERP and to provide oversight of the output. The 
adage of garbage in/garbage out is reconciled by the oversight provided by the 
Operations Officer. 
Previously in the “As-Is” model, the NATOPS Officer was required to manually 
check the schedule document against his roster of personnel qualifications to ensure that 
all members assigned to the schedule were safe to fly. There was no automation inside of 
the process model that allowed the “As-Is” schedule writing tool, SHARPS, to 
automatically check and then flag a violation of any safety of flight rules. The Radical 
model will utilize an If-then coding statement to check qualification currencies and will 
automatically flag any violations of the currency requirements. The NATOPS Officer is 
still required in the process model in order to provide the checks and balances system 
needed between the aviation safety requirements of the unit and the training requirements 
of the Training Officer.  
The Commanding Officer (CO) is provided more “real time” information in the 
Radical than his view in the “As-Is”. The CO can view the schedule as it is being 
developed via the ERP. The CO is able to provide input to the schedule and suggest 
changes at any point during the process. The ERP provided in the Radical allows the CO 
the ability to send the “schedule in work” back to the beginning of the process at any 
time. If the CO chooses to not look at the schedule until it is ready for his viewing and 
signature he is able to do so. The output of the Radical is the same as the “As-Is”; only 
the processes to produce the output have changed to become more efficient. Further, the 
two positions of the Assistant Operations Officer and the Schedules Officer are now 
available more often to fly missions in support of the unit.  
The Radical, with its reduction in force required to actively produce the schedule 
combined with the hefty increase in % IT, returned an increase in Return on Knowledge 
(ROK) of 1723% as shown in Figure 18 below (KVA spreadsheet). Again, the 
assumption remains that the unit will accept Business Process Re-engineering that will 
create different processes than those currently in use as formerly depicted in the “As-Is”. 
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“RADICAL” KVA SPREADSHEET 
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The elimination of the two aforementioned positions can be noted on the spread 
sheet as well as the increase in the percentage of IT used in the new process. The 
NATOPS Officer has a ROK of 920% mainly due to an increase in his IT usage to 80%. 
The NATOPS Officer’s job is automated in that the ERP will check the status of safety 
qualifications through the use of a query rather than the manual process of the “As-Is”. 
The arduous process of ensuring a Quality Assured (QA) schedule that was previously 
done by the Assistant Operations Officer, and the Operations Officer, is now being 
handled through the code of the ERP. The QA process, previously a manual process but 
requiring a great deal of on-the-job (OJT) learning time, is now eliminated and thus the 
Return on Knowledge increase and a financial outlay decrease are realized. 
The ROK from the “As-Is” was previously noted at 526% and the radical moved 
it to 1723%. The ROK, through the use of more IT and allowing the ERP to shoulder 
more of the work load, effectively increased the ROK more than three times greater than 
before. The “To-Be” spreadsheet had an ROK output of 669%. The radical again 
provided a modest increase of nearly triple the value of the Return on Knowledge by 
utilizing the ERP to produce the same output of a signed and quality assured flight 
schedule. The To-Be model provided an additional financial savings with the elimination 
of one position. The Radical improved upon the financial savings even more by 
eliminating two positions and allowing the ERP to conduct those same processes that the 
eliminated workforce once DoD. 
With regard to the radical approach to process reengineering within the 
Maintenance Department we discovered that no actors could feasibly be eliminated, as 
viewed in the Radical Maintenance Flowchart depicted below in Figure 19. Unlike the 
Operations Department that depended heavily upon schedule de-confliction, the 
Maintenance Department operates at a level where manual processes are more of a 
necessity and are hence more difficult to automate fully. However, there are countless 
ways to improve current practices using a radical approach. 
One of the most logical areas for improvement was mentioned previously, the 
introduction of an automated logbook entry system. Although Maintenance Control 
personnel (logbook clerks) would not theoretically be able to be omitted fully with the 
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introduction of such a system accumulating cost savings on par with the OPS Radical, 
there are a myriad of benefits to be realized. 
One obvious benefit is in the increased reliability in reporting for reasons 
previously mentioned before. Utilization of this type of technology allows for faster more 
accurate processing of entries taken from the individual work-centers, maintenance 
control, and the aircraft itself. Since these actors are currently performing the previously 
mentioned processes manually, the implementation of new business processes would 
allow them to simply have to monitor these new processes, thereby leaving more time to 
concentrate on the multitude of other processes within their realm of responsibility. 
Additionally, the level of training that is required has diminished along with the 
requirement for knowledge of the logbook keeping process, which in turn, means 
decreased overall costs associated with providing time to perform the required OJT. 
RADICAL PROCESS FLOWCHART (MAINTENANCE) 
 
 
Figure 19.   Radical Flowchart (Maintenance) 
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The radical approach to the Maintenance Department's execution of the daily 
flight schedule represents the possibility that the introduction of an ERP solution into the 
organization would likely provide for more timely and accurate decisions on an overall 
basis. Although it is an unknown of the ERPs ability to successfully replace the benefit 
achieved by human interaction on these processes within the organization; the ERPs 
value in a supporting role to everyday decision-making is apparent. During the execution 
of such tasks as tracking maintenance long-term goals, providing de-confliction of 
available aircraft against OPS requirements, or setting daily maintenance priorities based 
upon established minimums, the real benefits of an ERP as a decision aid is also 
apparent. The result of our assumptions regarding the possible benefits associated with 
the introduction of an increased level of IT within the Maintenance Department is 
displayed in the Radical KVA Maintenance spreadsheet, Figure 20.  
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“RADICAL” KVA SPREADSHEET (MAINTENANCE) 
 
 
Figure 20.   Radical KVA Spreadsheet (Maintenance) 
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The introduction of increased levels of IT into the Maintenance Department areas 
mentioned in the previous section show high levels of ROK across the entire 
organization. For the sub-process of directing maintenance actions to support the flight 
schedule, performed by the Maintenance Control CPO, a percentage increase in IT of just 
50% gave us a two-fold return on knowledge. Additionally, this increase in ROK was 
successfully achieved with a very conservative, 20 percent combined reduction in 
learning time (LT) and OJT.  
Assuming that one could decrease the amount of formal learning time even 
further, the perceived benefit of an investment in IT becomes even greater. In the 
Radical, the addition of the value of IT in the sub-processes of long range planning for 
maintenance actions, de-conflicting aircraft availability, and maintaining aircraft 
logbooks allowed for overall increases in the number of cycles performed and an overall 
reduction in time to complete, doing so with no added expenses.  
In our “To-Be” assumptions, the logbook clerks are able to complete, on average, 
90 logbook entries in a one week period of time. With the introduction of IT, according to 
our estimates the IT solution would provide a minimum of a 30 % increase in the amount 
of logbook entries that are able to be performed with all of the obvious benefits that have 
been previously mentioned. 
C. SUPER RADICAL 
The group further looked at how much more efficiency could possibly be obtained 
if the Information Technology envelope was pushed even further and a full automation of 
the squadron scheduling process was attempted. Figure 21 below, represents such a 
“Super Radical” model with full automation. 
In the super radical process model, all pilots except for the CO are free from the 
task of producing a schedule and therefore able to fly more missions and increase their 
and the squadron’s combat readiness proficiency. The freeing up of war fighters to hone 
their core capabilities is the goal of DoD and is in line with the corporate business model 
when considering whether to outsource tasks that are not core capabilities. In the super 
radical, the ERP is supported by Business Intelligence (BI). Normally ERPs are very 
good at transactional processes but rarely do they provide a means of tactical or strategic 
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decision making. By incorporating BI into the ERP and allowing adjacent and upper units 
access to the system, managers have more access to decision making tools. 
 
 
Figure 21.   Super Radical Flowchart 
 
Managers of the entire process of producing flight requirements down to the 
individual flyers and maintainers will have real time access to any tasks that are pending 
or currently being flown. This “all access” to data via the data warehouse will allow the 
managers to create any type of spreadsheet or form required in order to develop strategic 
decision making. For example, if a manager wanted to know which aircraft was the most 
dependable according to the maintenance records of availability, the information could be 
readily processed. If the manager wanted to know which pilot had the most current 
qualifications and the most experience, this information could also be extrapolated from 
the database. If this database were culminated into one form, one could see very easily 
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how crews and aircraft could be chosen together in an attempt to assure mission success. 
This strategic and tactical decision making ability could prove to be invaluable in support 
of high visibility and/or critical missions. 
The super radical is connected to a data warehouse in accordance to the basic 
business model provided by BI. The data warehouse contains not only all info about the 
personnel and materials in the squadron but also it contains information regarding supply 
and maintenance support. The super radical ERP is able to produce daily schedules based 
upon the availability of parts, personnel, and the requirements to train. The Operations 
Officer’s prior job of tracking and producing long range plans is now self- generated by 
the system. The system will utilize statistics and requirements in order to decide which 
training missions need to be flown in order to maintain and increase the readiness 
proficiency of the squadron.  
The Training Officer’s requirements will be automatically tracked by the new 
ERP by managing the squadrons personnel by using a percentage of combat readiness 
proficiency required for any given deployment or garrison schedule. By viewing the 
readiness proficiency as a percentage, pilots who are lower than a set percentage will 
have priority to fly along with those pilots designated as higher priority such as 
Instructors. In the Super Radical all requirements of upper level units such as the Air 
Wing are input into the ERP via real time inputs. The ERP will then validate the input 
and attempt to provide a schedule that will meet the demands of the input. The ERP will 
use the data warehouse for these validations by checking availability of all personnel, 
aircraft, and all safety of flight items such as bouncing the requirement off of the previous 
schedule to ensure that no pilot is double scheduled or breaking crew rest.  
The oversight of the system will be provided for at the squadron level by the 
Commanding Officer. Each day as the schedule is produced by the ERP, it is then made 
available to the Commanding Officer for viewing and approval. After viewing the 
schedule and approving it, the Commanding Officer is able to digitally sign the document 
and it is automatically distributed to all parties and available for printing.  
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The Super Radical for our project ends at the Operations Department but it is easy 
to see how this system could also automate the assignment of aircraft to the schedule in 
the Maintenance Department.  
The following Figure 22 depicts all of the models mentioned heretofore and 




COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF MODELS 
 
 
Figure 22.   Comparison of Models 
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D. EXAMPLE USE OF THE XVIONICS ERP TOOL 
This section will provide example views of the Xvionics XV-OMS 3.0 ERP tool. 
This section provides the reader with examples of the various views that can be made 
accessible to the end user. These views are not all inclusive and are representational only. 
However they do provide the reader with a solid base of expectation for the program 
provided by the Xvionics Corporation. It is relatively easy for one to surmise the benefit 
of such a system that allows any user with the correct permissions to gain access to any 
required information at “real time” speeds. This attribute will allow a tactical aviation 
squadron to increase their sortie rate by eliminating redundant processes and reducing the 
time required for others. The reduced administrative time could very lead to an increase 
in core competencies as the previously spent time can better utilized to allow pilots to fly 
and maintainers to actually turn wrenches. 
The flight mission order view, Figure 23, is what the officer making the schedule 
would use when generating a requirement for a mission. In this view, all pertinent data 
relating to a mission is either input into the system or selected by means of drop-down 
box. Information included in this view include the mission type, call sign, number of 
aircraft, type of aircraft, as well as many other types of information.  
Once completed by the scheduling officer, the mission requires approval by 
higher authority, with this being accomplished by a system of permissions. Once the 
designated authority has approved the mission, the mission becomes part of the Schedule 
View. One of the advantages to the use of a form like this is that it greatly reduces the 
amount of time required to generate a schedule, along with the benefit of greater accuracy 





Figure 23.   Flight Mission Order Initiation View 
 
The flight schedule viewing module in Xvionics OMS (XV-OMS), Figure 24, has 
the capability of displaying every type of mission order, except Technical Mission Orders 
(TEMOs). The four mission orders that the schedule view supports are the Flight Mission 
Order (FMO), Flight Support Order (FSO), Training Mission Order (TMO), Ground 
Mission Order and (GRMO).  
The use of XV-OMS allows for the filtering and sorting of all types of mission 
order data. The software only displays planned or active orders, and when the orders have 
already been executed, they are deleted from the scheduling window after a 
predetermined amount of time. Each section of this view lists the pilots, aircraft, call-




Figure 24.   Flight Schedule View 
 
The information located on this screen, as well as the information listed on the 
following screens, is available only to those personnel with the required permissions. 
In debrief view, Figure 25, XV-OMS provides the aircrew with an electronic 
means of capturing post-flight data. By clicking in any of the fields located in the above 
form, one is able to update the XV-OMS database with the most current information. 
Information that falls into this category would be such items as the actual takeoff and 
landing times, aircrew tasks completed during the flight, type and amount of ordnance 
expended, or any number of other categories of information. Additionally, there is a 
capability that allows the uploading of video from aircraft on-board video systems that 
provide aircrew with video footage taken during the preceding flight that the aircrew uses 









Figure 26.   Aircrew View 
 
The aircrew view, Figure 26 within the XV-OMS framework possesses the ability 
to manage details for aircrew and other officers within an organization. In the above 
figure, each row represents a single aircrew. By clicking in the requisite area, one can 
view any data about the aircrew that they need to in a just a matter of seconds. Some 
examples of the type of data available in the aircrew view are: 
• Graphical representation of an aircrews qualifications as related to a 
particular mission  
• Professional and personal details 
• Qualifications and performance history 
• Training and readiness levels 
• Current and planned activities 
• Physical presence 
In addition, XV-OMS also keeps historical data for reports and monitoring. 
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Figure 27.   Aircrew Courses Summary View 
 
This view, Aircrew Courses Summary View, Figure 27, provides a location for 
inputting and monitoring various qualifications associated with the flying of aircraft. 
These qualifications are mandatory to the success of a squadron achieving its status of 
being ready to deploy, in addition to many of them being safety related items. A 
comprehensive course listing coupled with the date that an aircrew member achieved the 
qualification or completed the course provides the operations or training officer with an 
easy to understand picture of the status of the aircrew under his cognizance. In addition to 
the individual qualifications, squadron totals and an overall status relating to “percent 




Figure 28.   Maintenance Personnel View 
 
The Maintenance Personnel View allows for the viewing of a maintenance 
personnel's data in a quick and easy format. With this view, one is able to monitor each of 
the personnel's activities, whether they are current or planned into the future. This data is 
depicted in Gantt chart format and allows the flexibility of being able to manage the 
maintenance personnel's presence within the work structure as well as being able to make 
inputs, updates and reviews. All of this culminates with an increased ability to allocate 




Figure 29.   Aircraft View 
 
The Aircraft View consists of a fixed data section and several dynamic data 
sections. The fixed section does not change in relation to the dynamic options and 
contains information such as the aircraft number, a symbol denoting the status of the of 
the aircraft in relation to its upcoming flight, the aircraft's physical location, and the 
number of maintenance discrepancies on the aircraft- with numbers greater than zero 
appearing in red notation. 
The dynamic section contains four different views related to the aircraft; they are 
the configuration view, the installations view, the maintenance records view and the 
special maintenance view. The configurations view shows the aircraft's current 
configuration and the required configuration for any given mission allowing for quick 
recognition by maintenance personnel of the differences between the two configurations. 
The installations view provides real-time information on aircraft installed components 
such as and their individual statuses. The maintenance and special maintenance views 
provide all of the current maintenance information as related to each of the aircraft.  
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Figure 30.   Aircraft-Mountable Systems View 
 
The Aircraft-Mountable Systems View, similar to the aircraft view, displays all of 
the information regarding such aircraft mounted systems as engines, electronic 
countermeasures pods, and camera pods. Each aircraft-mounted item is identified with a 
unique identification number as well as the aircraft tail number for which it is assigned to. 
Status boxes are also included that correspond to the items maintenance status, stating if 
the mounted system is in either an “up” or “down” operational status. If the item is in a 
down status, then a date of estimated availability may also be provided as well.  
Additionally, other information such as the last flight and a current list of 
discrepancies are readily available for maintenance personnel to take into consideration 




Figure 31.   Ground Equipment View 
 
The Ground Equipment View contains essentially the same information as the 
mountable systems view does. Ground equipment is utilized when working on the aircraft 
and when performing such tasks as moving the aircraft from one location to another. 
Examples of such equipment include ground equipment include aircraft towing vehicles, 
portable aircraft generators and aircraft oiling fixtures. The proper maintenance of ground 
equipment is essential in making sure that it is available when it is needed; this 
framework provides the maintainer with an easy to use screen in which to derive and 





Figure 32.   Airfield/ Navaid Data 
 
The Airfield/Navaid Data View is able to be accessed by aircrew when planning a 
mission route. It provides airfield data such as runway numbers, dimensions, status and 
other pertinent remarks.  
E. UTILIZING COMMERCIAL OFF THE SHELF (COTS) 
An evaluation of the Xvionics software or any other Enterprise Resource Planning 
tool would not be complete without a discussion regarding the hurdles of using 
Commercial off the shelf (COTS) end items in the DoD. Since the Xvionics software is 
not produced by the U.S. military, it would be considered a COTS acquisition. There are 
many concerns that arise when the military attempts use of software or hardware that is 
produced by outside sources. A Project Manager or Acquisition Officer must weigh 
several concerns regarding security (confidentiality, integrity, and availability), 
maintainability, modifiability, and performance. Questions regarding these and other 
quality attributes will have to be specified and prioritized before enabling a commercial 
system to be added to a DoD component. The following section will address some of 
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these issues along with the financial benefits of using COTS and a discussion of how the 
current financial system which is being transformed will support the use of COTS. 
Lastly, there will be recommendations for risk mitigation when implementing COTS in a 
U.S. defense environment. 
Commercial off the shelf (COTS) products fall into the category of both hardware 
and software items. The low cost of purchase, as opposed to the price of development for 
a new system by the end user, makes COTS a great solution for enterprises that have a 
restrictive budget. The DoD, always in search of budget reduction methods, views the use 
of COTS as a viable means of meeting the IT requirements of the DoD while remaining 
within budget constraints placed on them by Congress. 
The performance requirements that the DoD places on the COTS derives the 
hurdles faced by the DoD when implementing the use of commercial systems. The DoD 
requires that significant procedures are put in place to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of all data that is transmitted, stored, and created on DoD 
systems. The military component of the DoD has even more stringent requirements due 
to the environments that the systems will be exposed to during the normal operations of a 
military unit. Often, and predictably, Navy squadrons will be deployed aboard ship board 
activities in order to train and provide combat capabilities from a sea-based platform.  
It is possible to modify the source code of a COTS system, but this would require 
a large outlay of funds for the code, therefore eliminating the greatest advantage of COTS 
procurement, cost. The modified source code system is known as a Military off the shelf 
system (MOTS), and it can be modified by the end user or the sales vendor. The modified 
COTS system would not receive the same automatic updates and technical support as 
would the unmodified COTS system. However, the reliability of the protection of the 
data when using MOTS would be greatly enhanced over the use of COTS. If the 
modifications that the military requires are done by the vendor then MOTS will face the 
same hurdles as the COTS systems.23 The government agency of the DoD will not be 
able to rely on the code nor updates to the code anymore than they can on an unmodified 
                                                 
23 L. Sha, R .Rajkumar, and M. Gagliardi, “Evolving Dependable Real-Time Systems.” Proceedings of 
the 1996 IEEE Aerospace Applications Conference, vol. 1, New York, NY, 3-10 February, 1996, pp. 335-
346. 
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COTS system. This section will discuss the financial pros and cons as seen from the 
viewpoints of three stakeholders; the government policy makers, the commercial vendor 
such as Xvionics, and the military end user.  
1. Government Policy Makers  
In 1994, the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Acquiring Defense 
Software Commercially was tasked with providing an independent advisory report to the 
Secretary of Defense representing their opinions and recommendations in regards to the 
use of COTS in the DoD. Interestingly the viewpoint of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence at the time, Emmett 
Paige Jr., can be summarized in his quote at a software technology management 
conference where he stated, “U.S. war-fighters have enough to do with their missions. 
They don’t have the time or resources to learn to use or fix software.”24  
Currently, the Secretary of Defense is highly interested in the idea of radical 
transformation in the DoD. Specifically, he is interested in creating an environment that 
will lead to an unqualified audit much in the same vein as a corporate enterprise. The 
Institute for Defense Analyses was contracted by the Secretary of Defense in order to 
support the decision making process by providing relevant, reliable, and timely 
information to the decision makers and managers. It is realized that partnering with the 
private sector can lead to performance improvement of the support systems in the DoD 
by leveraging the competitive nature of the corporate environment. There are many 
disparate systems in use throughout the DoD. During the teams’ Thesis research; we 
witnessed many of these systems in work at various squadrons. Many systems are built 
and added to by individuals at the unit level and require many different interfaces in order 
to integrate with the systems of parallel units, upper and lower echelon units as well. 
Standardization is required in order to allow the disparate legacy systems to be 
replaced and integrated systems to be utilized via Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
tools and Business Process Engineering utilizing Business Intelligence (BI) mirroring the 
corporate arena. The use of an ERP incorporating BI will be discussed in more detail 
later. In order to create a standardized environment, Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
                                                 
24 United States Department of Defense SPEECHES, Volume 11, Number 17 “Tying Together the 
Best Individual Intellectual Efforts,” 1998, last accessed February 2006. 
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systems will have to be used to the greatest extent where unique military coding is not 
required. The financial burden of research and development is borne by the commercial 
industry rather than the end users; allowing the war-fighters alluded to by Mr. Paige to 
concentrate on their core capability requirements.  
The inherent difficulty in obtaining a clean financial audit within the DoD lies in 
the three different ways the DoD applies funding. The government utilizes 
Appropriations, Reimbursable, and Working Capital Funding; whereas, the civilian sector 
only uses one type of funding based on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Since 
the civilian sector deals with revenue, it is a much easier fit with COTS software. Often 
times, COTS software already exists for commercial applications. The DoD performs 
many similar functions as the commercial sector in various function levels. Market 
Comparables could be used in order to find the best fit/best value commercial solution to 
DoD system requirements. Examples would be comparing the process functions of the 
United Parcel Service (UPS) to an AMC squadron in the U.S. Air Force or the supply 
system to a corporation that has master supply chain management software such as Wal-
Mart, or comparing the use of Xvionics software in a U.S. Navy jet squadron with the 
commercial equivalent COTS software in a commercial entity such as NetJets.  
It is a fairly difficult task if not considered impossible by some, to fit the current 
financial framework of the DoD into a COTS system due to the many ingrained processes 
that makeup the three funding methods. However, if the DoD accepts Business Process 
Reengineering, then new processes would be adopted, standardization would be obtained, 
COTS could be implemented, and costs would be reduced along with the number of 
processes. The inefficiencies of many disparate subsystems increases the cost of use due 
to duplication of effort by many end users, input errors caused by multiple input 
environments, and loss of info due to improper interfaces between the different systems.  
In roads have been made since the CFO Act was established in 1990 expressing 
the desire for a clean financial audit. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 
was established with a mission “to be the preeminent provider of information systems 
support to our war-fighters and others as required by the Department of Defense, under 
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all conditions of peace and war.”25 DISA provides computer support to the DoD in all 
areas from accounting to medical. DISA recognizes that the rapid and ever changing 
environment of information technology requires commercial support. It is recognized that 
the “best value solution” is often reached by support from the civilian sector when 
making the buy or build decision. DISA is committed to ensuring the cost of supplying 
the computing needs of the DoD is the lowest possible while meeting the requirements of 
the end user, and maintaining availability to the war-fighter in any environment. The use 
of COTS enables this philosophy. By locating many DISA agencies throughout the U.S., 
the standardization hurdle is eased by the multiple sites yielding the same support to 
many different users.  
The DoD must not only recognize the need for changes in the business process 
but also changes in the means of acquiring the new COTS technology. The DoD 
Authorization Act of 1996 contained the Information Technology Management Reform 
Act.26 The reform act DoD away with the General Services Administration (GSA) Board 
of Contract Appeals. This allowed for implementation of large information systems and 
modular acquisition of said systems. This means that the development of information 
technology systems will be included in the cost of acquiring the system. This avenue 
allows the widespread use of COTS when it meets the requirements of the DoD. The use 
of Enterprise Resource Planning tools has become recognized as a viable means of 
incorporating the best value practices of the commercial sector into DoD organizations. 
Specific examples of these are the Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) and the 
Marine Corps Enterprise Information Technology Services (MCEITS). Both will be 
discussed in a later section. 
The Defense Science Board (DSB) found that there were many similarities 
between the DoD built systems and the commercial systems. However, it was noted by 
the task board that the commercial development efforts have “achieved better 
predictability and lower costs” than the DoD derived systems. It must be noted that cost 
is not the only factor when considering the DoD’s use of COTS. The DoD must also 
                                                 
25 DISA, Defense Information Systems Agency, Department of Defense, http://www.disa.mil., last 
accessed February 2006. 
26 United States Department of Defense SPEECHES, Volume 11, Number 17 “Tying Together the 
Best Individual Intellectual Efforts,” 1998, website, last accessed February 2006. 
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consider its requirement for information assurance thus requiring a stringent oversight of 
commercial vendors in there development of systems to be used by the DoD. A mutual 
trust partnership would have to be developed and adhered to. One can easily see the 
applicability of this requirement when incorporating the Xvionics software program in a 
U.S. aviation squadron. 
2. The Commercial Vendor’s Prospective 
The incentive is obvious for the commercial vendor. The DoD would most likely 
be the largest single customer to any vendor and the guarantee of payment would also be 
of great comfort to the vendor. Under President Bill Clinton, the telecommunications 
reform act was passed. It allowed for more use of telecommunications technology 
support from commercial sources. The need of the United States to engage in conflicts in 
the International arena requires a means of communicating with our international allies 
and coalitions. This need being met by commercial vendors leads to increased 
competition which in turn leads to lower costs for the DoD. 
The commercial vendor is able to supply mature development processes that have 
been learned through many years of competition on the open market. The life cycle costs 
and maintenance costs are absorbed by the entire market rather than a single user when 
commercial vendors are used supplying a COTS system. Most military systems are 
proprietary in nature and have a life cycle of 20 years. The commercial software has a 
lifecycle of 1 to 2 years. The long lifecycle of the military system does not support quick 
turnarounds on upgrades, updates, and changes. The cost benefit of COTS is the life 
cycle support that is provided by the vendor exposing the end user to readily available 
updates throughout the life cycle phases.  
Commercial vendors are able to supply entire systems that not only streamline the 
business processes but also enable many users across the organizational spectrum the 
ability to view real time information regarding all departments of the organization. The 
Xvionics ERP would allow the Commanding Officer the ability to view the schedule 
progress in “real time” as it is being developed by the Operations Officer. This view 
would allow errors to be caught early in the build process of daily schedule writing and 
would create greater efficiencies in the organization.  
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Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) tools have been around for long time and up 
until now they have only been able to streamline the processes and aid in the viewing of 
the transactional process. However, the ERPs have not allowed the manager to be able to 
make strategic decisions. This capability is needed by the Military commanders and it is 
part of the goal of the CFO Act and the Secretary of Defense goal of providing the 
managers with relevant, reliable, and timely information. If we can obtain an unqualified 
audit, and it is utilized properly through the educated study of the output, a commander 
will be able to make both strategic and tactical decisions in support of the organization’s 
mission.  
The latest development in the commercial sector is the use of Business (BI) 
Intelligence. A recent CIO magazine poll, at the time of this writing, stated that the next 
big purchase in Information Technology by IT managers is going to be in the field of 
Business Intelligence. BI is going to allow management the ability to formulate any type 
of desired spreadsheet or form that they wish by pulling DoD from not only their 
workstation but also from DoD warehouses that can store practically infinite (as much 
storage as one can afford) amounts of accessible DoD. This allows the manager to be able 
to make decisions based on real time information and to be able to customize the DoD 
used to support the decision making. In environments where time is money and the 
competitive advantage is realized by those that have information superiority it is easy to 
see where the financial advantage in Business Intelligence lay. In environments where 
timing allows one competitor to outwit or decide faster such as in combat, BI ascertained 
from COTS may be the key to victory over an enemy force.  
Advances in technology, increased requirements for information technology 
support, and the financial guidance from Congress and the Secretary of Defense have 
steered the DoD towards the commercial sector for more efficient, cost effective, and 
updated technical support. To that end the Navy and the Marine Corps have implemented 
programs that mirror business models of commercial industry. Navy and Marine Corps 
Internet (NMCI) and the Marine Corps Enterprise Information Technology Services 
(MCEITS) have been implemented to harvest the “best value” practices of the 
commercial vendor. MCEITS Enterprise IT Centers will replace the disjointed 
organizations that make up the current environment of DoD processing support 
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throughout the Marine Corps. The goal of the MCEITS is to provide more consistent 
service, standardization, and to leverage the advancement in information technologies 
while increasing the protection of sensitive DoD. By making enterprise wide investment 
decisions, standardization and mass purchasing power will be used to achieve a greater 
cost benefit. 
Additionally, information in the MCEITS infrastructure will be made available 
globally, allowing relevant, reliable, and timely information to be accessed by the 
decision makers. This will be enabled through the use of an enterprise enabled framework 
much like an Enterprise Resource Planning tool with Business intelligence. According to 
the government publication referenced, “MCEITS also leverages bandwidth 
enhancements provided by the transformational communications initiatives, such as 
Global Information Grid-Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE) and Navy-Marine Corps 
Internet (NMCI). Along with the IT initiatives of the Marine Corps Programs of Record 
such as Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC), Continuity of 
Operators Planning, Unit Operations Center, and Common Aviation Command and 
Control System to provide a managed and controlled enterprise environment from which 
users can access information from anywhere on the network in support of war fighting 
and Supporting Establishment (SE) processes.27 Commercial vendors stand ready to 
provide solutions that will enable the Secretary of Defense transformational views to be 
realized.  
3. Military End User 
When incorporating COTS systems into an organization, the most cost savings 
will be recognized if the stakeholders are involved during the development and 
implementation phases. In these two phases there is no more important stakeholder than 
the end user. The end user is important in his/her ideas of the output of the system. The 
end user is the person that interfaced with the legacy system on a daily basis before the 
change environment. The user must have buy-in so that he/she will help with setting 
realistic expectations of the finished system. Since the implementation of a standardized 
COTS system will involve business process reengineering there must be no confusion as 
                                                 
27 Government Publication Office, Warfighting Concepts, Emerging and Enabling Capabilities, 
Chapter 2, p. 103, GPO-017-126, 2005. 
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to what the output must be since the old processes required to operate the legacy system 
will most likely be changed for efficiency sake.  
The military end user often requires a system that is physically hardened as well 
as information security hardened. Because of the short life cycle of COTS, security is of 
the greatest concern due to the prominence of patches and updates. If a modicum of 
security can be reached while taking advantage of the cost benefit of mass production of 
COTS, the goal of the Congress to find the best value while supporting the war fighter 
will be obtained. Often times COTS systems are rushed to market with known 
vulnerabilities because of the belief that he who is first to market wins. The military will 
have to create the aforementioned mutual trust relationships in order to establish the 
acceptable levels of security while still meeting the mission requirements. Fortunately, 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is already in use in the commercial sector and its security 
benefits would aid the end user’s requirements for secure DoD transmission.  
By incorporating Business Intelligence at the unit level of management, decisions 
on how best to employ a unit can be made in real time in order to support the higher 
mission. A cost savings will be realized by eliminating redundant efforts, streamlining 
processes and by providing the managers with reliable, relevant, and timely information. 
Through the use of integration of all systems with a single interface, individual end users 
will be more effective in their communication with adjacent and higher units leading to 
faster response times furthering the cost savings.  
4. COTS Conclusion 
The DoD must consider a great deal of factors besides cost when considering the 
use of COTS, but all of those factors will have an impact on the cost. Other financial 
concerns are the financial constraints placed on DoD acquisitions in the form of timelines 
required to process requests for new projects and receive approval for funding as 
indicated in this chapter on COTS. The unique environments and unique requirements of 
DoD users require a level of sensitivity during the development, implementation, and 
support phases. Considerations such as the location of the building facility would have to 
be investigated. Fortunately, corporate espionage warrants some of the same concerns 
and builders of systems have had to contend with those requirements for many years and 
data safety is not unique to Department of Defense. Cultural bias of the DoD employees 
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towards legacy systems will have to be overcome. A type of reward system that benefits 
the managers and users for financial responsibility in their decision making will lead to a 
greater use of COTS.  
An increase in educated end users will encourage the use of the commercial best 
practices of implementing software. This will allow the proper support during the rapid 
development and change in information technology advances of the commercial sector. 
Security must be built into the system during development as it is very costly to try and 
build it into a system already in the implementation phase. An acceptance of Business 
Process Reengineering is required in order to accept the introduction of new technologies 
allowing the DoD organizations to leverage the benefits of the commercial sector. The 
DoD is a hierarchal based organization and thusly its members will perform to whatever 
standard their immediate superior demands. They will also perform to the incentive. 
There has to be incentives for and decisions to reengineer the business processes 
of the DoD sent down from the head of the organization. There has to be a positive bias 
towards the use of COTS in a standardized format allowing interfaces between adjacent 
units and differing units such as the Air Force and the Marine Corps. The need for joint 
operations and interoperability requires the leveraging of commercial technology to 
ensure the survivability of the information superiority of the U.S. military. 
F. IT OUTSOURCING FOR DOD 
The research team in evaluating the Xvionics software delved into the 
considerations that must be discussed when deciding to outsource the IT requirements of 
the DoD. Our belief is that IT outsourcing, if utilized correctly, can be a smart cost-
cutting initiative. If utilized incorrectly or implemented poorly; outsourcing can be very 
costly and an inefficient use of resources. Since outsourcing can be on any scale, a leader 
should plan the parameters of the scale before submitting a bid for outsourcing. If one 
were to need some IT help in order to get a new system online, it would be a very costly 
mistake to keep the temporary workers onboard far after the system has been 
incorporated and is in the maintenance phase. Outsourcing should only be used to 
enhance the capabilities that the organization does not consider to be core competencies. 
This allows the regular workers to concentrate on their core competencies, becoming 
more efficient, productive, and as a result, reducing costs to operate.  
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The military will outsource IT requirements in order to gain the knowledge of the 
outsourced agent. The core competency of the outsourced agent is their knowledge in 
whatever field that is being outsourced. One could argue that it is more expensive to 
outsource than to do it yourself, but due to the ever increasing changes in the IT 
environment, it is very costly to train and maintain training currency for permanent 
personnel handling IT issues in the military organization. Much like going out to eat at a 
fine dining establishment, outsourcing IT can be an expensive one time cost, but it would 
cost a great deal more to learn how to do all of the tasks required to serve an elaborate 
meal just as it would be cost prohibitive to train all military communicators to be able to 
handle all of the DoD IT requirements and maintain proficiency in the ever changing IT 
environment. Outsourcing once is much cheaper than paying for permanent personnel 
training continuously; of course, the outsourcing depends largely on a trusted 
relationship. The organization has to trust that the outsourcing agent has the correct 
knowledge to meet the requirement of the organization that has the outsourcing need. If 
the outsourced agent does not possess the prerequisite knowledge then the outsourcing 
will fail and will be a very costly mistake. 
By utilizing outsourcing, a leader is able to take advantage of standardization 
amongst the enterprise. As previously stated, outsourcing can be on any scale. NMCI is 
an example of outsourcing on a grand scale that allows inter-enterprise standardization 
and allows the Navy and Marine Corps to take advantage of the absolute latest 
information and IT updates available. By using a business organization that has a 
monetary incentive, the Navy is further able to take advantage of innovative thinking that 
is a direct result of competition. If there was no outsourcing, as was previously the case, 
there is no incentive for innovation but rather personnel are motivated towards mission 
accomplishment only in support of the Commanders Intent. Thusly, innovative thinking 
due to competition, leads to efficiencies being reached that would not have been thought 
of otherwise in a non competitive, military IT environment. After all, the people who 
build systems know more about how an organization works than anyone. They have a 
much greater understanding of the business processes, especially efficiencies vs. 
effectiveness. This also provides a single source of knowledge that allows inputs for 
change to be more easily implemented in a much broader scope. A simple example would 
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be Windows updates. The process would be very simple if the updates were received at a 
centralized location and then dispersed out from there at once to all of the supported 
systems. This analogy could be compared to the role of the outsourced agent and their 
ability to disperse their knowledge to all supported activities simultaneously.  
Bottom line, if used correctly, with the proper limits on the scale parameters, 
outsourcing of IT allows an organization to take advantage of expert knowledge without 
incurring the exorbitant training costs associated with gaining the requisite IT knowledge. 
Outsourcing further allows the organization to take advantage of value pricing by 
utilizing a type of “one stop” shopping metric. Additionally, outsourcing allows the 
organization, through the use of a broker, to be able to place the “best” provider together 
with the technology need of the unit. There is no paying for frills that one doesn’t require 
or didn’t ask for if outsourcing is implemented correctly resulting in a greater savings. 
This highlights the importance of the role of the broker in that you only receive what you 
ask and pay for. NMCI is projected to save the Navy more than $400 million dollars per 
year. By eliminating the need for each unit to support itself with individual equipment 
(software, hardware, training, etc), outsourcing IT allows the Navy to obtain a fixed price 
for all of its IT needs and negotiate a performance based contract which yields the latest 
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V. SUMMARY 
A. THESIS DATA SUMMARIZATION 
The following is a summarization of the data from the KVA with market 
comparables case study of VFA-14’s operations and maintenance processes of producing 
an approved daily flight schedule for execution. 
1. Allocated Knowledge 
The “As-Is” models yield a total allocated knowledge of 1585.25 knowledge units 
(KU). This is broken down as 63.85 KU for operations and 1521.40 KU for maintenance. 
Allocated knowledge represents the total knowledge that resides in the processes in order 
for them to be executed. 
The total allocated knowledge in the “To-Be” models increases 495.19 KU to 
2080.44 KU from the 1585.25 KU that is resident in the “As-Is” models. This represents 
86.78 KU in the operations processes and 1993.66 KU in the maintenance processes. The 
increases were achieved using BPR techniques to implement incremental improvements 
into the processes. 
The total allocated knowledge in the “Radical” models increases 1120.8 KU from 
the “To-Be” models for a total of 3201.24 KU in the “Radical” models. This is 
represented by 139.61 KU for the “Radical” operations processes and 3061.64 KU for the 
“Radical” maintenance processes. These increases were achieved by completely 
redesigning the “As-Is” models into the “Radical” by using BPR techniques and using 
data from the Israeli Air Force “As-Is” models which have highly automated processes 
with the implementation of an ERP. 
2. Allocated Percentages 
The values of the processes in all the models in the case study are heavily 
weighted towards the maintenance processes. In the “As-Is”, “To-Be”, and “Radical” 
models the maintenance processes contribute approximately 95.81% of the weighted 
average to the total ROK%. The operations processes contribute approximately 4.18% of 
the weighted average to the total ROK%. This shows that by examining only operations 
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and maintenance processes that deal with the planning and support of generating the 
squadron’s flight schedule, the maintenance processes play a larger role. 
3. Numerator 
A market comparable obtained from NetJets Inc. was used to express the benefits 
generated in the numerator for the ROK ratio into the common units of dollars. The 
revenue used to generate the common units in the numerator was fixed at $9,200,000 per 
year for the purposes of the case study.  This is a conservative estimate for potential 
revenue generated from an organization that conducts flight planning and maintenance 
activities.  For the “As-Is”, “To-Be”, and “Radical” models, the revenue generated for 
both operations and maintenance to execute the processes in this case study is $4,423.08 
per hour. In reality, revenue would likely increase from the “As-Is”, “To-Be”, and 
“Radical” models as the processes are improved through BPR. However, this was not 
explored in this case study.  
4. Denominator 
The denominator values in the ROK ratios represent the personnel costs per hour 
to execute the operations and maintenance processes in the “As-Is”, “To-Be”, and 
“Radical” models. The cost per hour in the “As-Is” model is $129.07. This is represented 
by $33.85 per hour for operations processes and $95.22 per hour for maintenance 
processes.  
The total hourly cost in the “To-Be” model is $109.05. This is a decrease of 
$20.02 per hour from the “As-Is” model. The $109.05 is broken down as $27.57 per hour 
for operations processes and $81.48 per hour for maintenance processes. The decrease in 
costs per hour is attained using BPR techniques to eliminate redundant or low value 
processes. 
The total hourly cost in the “Radical” model is $69.98. This is a decrease of 
$39.07 per hour from the “To-Be” model. The $69.98 per hour cost is broken down as 
$11.20 per hour for operations processes and $58.79 per hour for maintenance processes. 
The costs savings were achieved using BPR techniques to redesign the “As-Is” processes 
based on inputs from the Israeli Air Forces whose “As-Is” processes are closely modeled 




The total return on knowledge percentages increases from the “As-Is”, “To-Be” 
and “Radical” models. The “As-Is” model returns a total ROK of 3427%. After 
incrementally improving the “As-Is” model with logical changes, the “To-Be” model 
returns a ROK of 4056%. This increase of 629% represents the result of applying 
minimal BPR techniques to reduce redundant processes and implementing small 
increases of information technology into largely manual processes. The “Radical” model 
returns an ROK of 6320% which is an increase of 2264% from the “To-Be” model. This 
model represents a larger redesign of processes with large increases of information 
technology to facilitate executing the processes. The input for the “Radical” models in 
both the operations and maintenance processes was attained from current practices in the 
Israeli Air Force who utilize an ERP program for similar processes. The Israeli Air 
Forces “As-Is” models and processes were the vision for the US Navy’s “Radical” 
models represented in this case study. 
By assuming the “Radical” models were implemented in a US Navy squadron 
similar to the one examined in the case study, the following results could be expected. 
For the operations and maintenance departments to execute all of the processes on a daily 
basis to generate an approved flight schedule ready for execution would take 
approximately 7.2 hours of effort by the various actors occurring either in tandem or 
sequentially. The theoretical revenue generated per hour by these processes is $4,423.08. 
This would generate approximately $31,846 of revenue per day in the generation of a 
daily flight schedule. Assuming a squadron produces this flight schedule five times a 
week and 50 weeks out of the year, annual revenue of approximately $7,961,500 could be 
expected.  The 12 squadron estimate revenue would be approximately $95,538,000. 
The personnel costs to execute the processes in the “Radical” models for the 
operations and maintenance department are $69.98 per hour. By executing the processes 
in the same 7.2 hours and following the same number of occurrences per year to generate 
the flight schedule, the personnel costs per year to generate an approved flight schedule 
are $125,962.50. This would yield net revenue of $7,835,537.50 per year to generate a 
daily flight schedule using the processes in the “Radical” models.  The personnel costs 
over 12 squadrons would be approximately $1,511,550. 
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The information technology costs for the system have not been addressed thus far.  
The following data has been obtained from Mr. Gamliel “Jicko” Shitrit, Director of 
Engineering at Xvionics Corporation.  The costs to implement the system in one Navy 
Squadron such as the squadron used in the case study, VFA-14 would include 
implementation, licensing, maintenance, integration and customization.  The total cost in 
year for a one squadron implementation would be approximately $585,000.  This is a 
conservative estimate based on the number of systems the XV-OMS program would have 
to integrate with.  The integration costs are approximately $50,000 per system XV-OMS 
would have to operate with.  The $585,000 reflects only one integration cost of $50,000.  
This is a conservative estimate of the potential systems XV-OMS would have to integrate 
with as the current US Navy “As-Is” model reflects limited essential IT systems in use at 
the squadron level to conduct flight planning and maintenance activities.  The costs to 
implement XV-OMS over 12 squadrons would be approximately $5,668,000 assuming 
each squadron integrated XV-OMS with one system.  This reflects roughly a 10% 
discount in costs over a single squadron implementation. 
The potential ROI from implementing XV-OMS ERP into a Navy squadron 
would be the annual estimated revenue of $7,961,000 less the personnel costs of 
$125,962.50 less the year one implementation cost of $585,000 divided by the personnel 
costs and implementation costs equals an ROI of approximately 1019.8% for one Navy 
squadron.  The ROI for a 12 squadron implementation using the same formula would be 
approximately 1230.7%.  These ROI calculations are based on conservative estimates of 
revenue and cost data and neither captures all of the potential costs, nor do they factor in 
the depreciation of the year one implementation costs over the lifecycle of the system.  
With over a 1000% ROI on the implementation of the XV-OMS system, these estimates 
are orders of magnitude above the breakeven point and make the acquisition and 
implementation of this system a real option for the U.S. Navy. 
B. CONCLUSION 
1. Implications for the U.S. NAVY 
Based on the results from this research and examination of the XV-OMS ERP 
program, the following options are available to the U.S. Navy.  The first is always to 
maintain the status quo and do nothing.  This will produce ROI results shown in the “As-
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Is” models for operations and maintenance.  These processes are largely manual, take 
longer to complete and generate less potential revenue. 
The second option would be to pursue implementation of the XV-OMS system at 
one U.S. Navy F/A-18 squadron, measure the results using this methodology throughout 
the process and determine if a larger implementation at multiple squadrons is warranted.  
This would be a natural risk reducing strategy as the system is installed incrementally at 
one squadron and could be operated in tandem with existing systems or processes until 
squadron personnel were fully trained on the system. 
The third option would be to pursue a full implementation across multiple 
squadrons at NAS Lemoore Ca to generate the largest potential ROI.  This is the most 
costly and risky strategy in the event the implementation fails or does not meet the needs 
of the users at the squadron level.  However, this option, if implemented enterprise wide 
utilizing the “Radical” model would generate the largest potential ROI to the U.S. Navy. 
There are additional options available, but these represent three viable options 
from which additional strategies could be derived from.  These and other options depend 
on the organizational support of the U.S. Naval Aviation community and DoD acquisition 
community and assume funding and approval from stakeholders.    
2. KVA Final Thoughts 
Some general assumptions were made upon completing the KVA spreadsheets for 
the “To-Be” and the “Radical” changes to the scheduling process. The U.S. Navy 
squadron is not a “for profit” organization and therefore its value stems from the 
knowledge base inside of the squadron. That knowledge is the proficiency of each 
member from the individual pilots, the Commanding Officer, all the way down to the 
individual mechanics who ready the aircraft in support of the scheduled missions. The 
more knowledge gained, the more valuable the unit. This could be read as Return on 
Investment in an organization that does not utilize fiscal profit to measure ROI but uses 
mission accomplishment instead.  The more secondary tasks that are required of 
individuals the less able they are to gain proficiency in their core capabilities due to time 
constraints. There are a finite amount of hours in a day. 
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By increasing the % IT usage in the squadron, we were able to improve the 
Return on Knowledge. We ascertained that a reasonable assumption is that by increasing 
the % IT in the squadron will decrease the time required to complete the process leading 
to an increase in output. With the increase in IT, the squadron is able to produce more 
than one schedule during the constraint of time in a business day. Simply, if they were a 
business, they could produce more widgets at a greater rate than a rival company that 
utilized the “As-Is” process. Theoretically, we could produce more schedules with the 
increase in IT usage. However, the squadron only needs to produce one schedule per day. 
If one was at the wing level with a large ERP that produced a schedule for multiple 
subordinate units this would possibly play a factor in decreased cost and increased 
revenue. 
Further, increasing the % IT will increase the Return on Knowledge due to IT 
being utilized to complete the mundane task of schedule writing. This allows the pilots 
whose primary role is to increase their combat proficiency, to concentrate on actual flying 
tasks as they would have more time available to do so since their requirement to sit at a 
desk and generate a schedule is now compressed. More time to fly equates to higher 
proficiency which equates to a higher knowledge base inside of the unit.  All of this will 
yield a higher Return on Investment. 
Lastly, increasing the IT usage would lead to a reduction in costs via a reduction 
in manpower required to produce the schedule. The most pronounced effect on 
manpower would occur in the implementation of the “Super Radical” but all of the 
models represent a reduction in the force requirement to produce a quality assured flight 
schedule.    
C. POTENTIAL FOLLOW ON RESEARCH  
• Apply this methodology to all of the squadron department processes e.g. 
Safety, Training, Administration, etc 
• Examine the implementation of an ERP at the Wing organizational level 
to centralize the scheduling of flight operations of all squadrons under 
their operational control. 
• Conduct a Real Options analysis from the results of this case study to 
determine potential feasibility of implementation. 
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• Examine the potential effects of revenue on organizational processes by 
implementing an ERP system. 
• Examine the cost of IT in an organizations process to include the 
acquisition of, implementation of and the maintenance. 
• Review the Greek Air Force implementation of an ERP system into their 
flight scheduling processes. 
• Examine the risks to the Navy for incremental implementation vs. 
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